A repeated game of self regulation
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsSelf-Regulation; Quality Regulation; fraud; corruption.;
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
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