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Incentivos Reputacionales para la Autorregulación: Un Análisis Experimental

Author

Listed:
  • Javier Nuñez
  • Jose Luis Lima

Abstract

Las industrias de bienes de confianza generalmente se encuentran organizadas como Organizaciones Autorregluadas (OA). Sin embargo, la autorregulación implica una situación de captura regulatoria por lo cual los incentivos de la OA para controlar la calidad provista en el mercado y denunciar evidencia de provisión de mala calidad no están garantizadas. En este trabajo analizamos, utilizando técnicas experimentales, si crear una reputación de buena calidad entre los consumidores es suficiente para que la OA tengan los incentivos para hacer su trabajo. Nuestros resultados ofrecen un sólido soporte a la posibilidad de que la OA realice su trabajo por motivos reputacionales en el caso en que es teóricamente factible. También encontramos evidencia de que los consumidores pueden aprender la estructura del mercado y ajustar su comportamiento hacia los equilibrios teóricos, y de esta manera suplir su falta de experimentación directa de la mala calidad y control.

Suggested Citation

  • Javier Nuñez & Jose Luis Lima, 2005. "Incentivos Reputacionales para la Autorregulación: Un Análisis Experimental," Working Papers wp216, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp216
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L84 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Personal, Professional, and Business Services

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