Self-Regulatory Organizations Under the Shadow Of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation
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Other versions of this item:
- Silvester Van Koten & Andreas Ortmann, 2016. "Self-Regulatory Organizations under the Shadow of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Sebastian J. Goerg & John R. Hamman (ed.),Experiments in Organizational Economics, volume 19, pages 85-104, Emerald Publishing Ltd.
- Andreas Ortmann, 2014. "Self-Regulatory Organizations under the Shadow of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers p0412, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
- Silvester Van Koten & Andreas Ortmann, 2014. "Self-Regulatory Organizations under the Shadow of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation," RSCAS Working Papers 2014/114, European University Institute.
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More about this item
Keywordsexperimental economics; self-regulatory organizations; governmental oversight;
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2015-01-03 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-CBE-2015-01-03 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2015-01-03 (Experimental Economics)
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