Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance
We analyse the possibility of successful industry self-regulation in terms of the strategic interactions between industry members and government. In particular, this paper presents a game-theoretic typology of generic self-regulatory scenarios and evaluates these in terms of the resulting likelihood of collective compliance. Examples for the scenarios are discussed and conclusions for corporate and public policy offered.
|Date of creation:||07 Apr 2003|
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