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Demokratie und internationale Investitionsabkommen: (Überraschende) Zusammenhänge und (lückenhafte) Erklärungen

Author

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  • Nunnenkamp Peter

    (Institut für Weltwirtschaft, KielGermany)

Abstract

Im Rahmen der TTIP Verhandlungen stellt sich aktuell die Frage, warum hochentwickelte demokratische Staaten den Souveränitätsverzicht in Kauf nehmen sollten, der mit internationaler Streitschlichtung vor privaten Schiedsgerichten verbunden ist. Dieser Beitrag ordnet diese Frage in einen breiteren Kontext ein. Relativ glaubwürdige nationale Institutionen sollten es für demokratisch verfasste Gastländer ausländischer Direktinvestitionen weniger dringlich machen, sich international die Hände zu binden, um einen effektiven Schutz vor staatlicher Willkür zu bieten. Gleichwohl haben demokratische Gastländer bei der weltweiten Verbreitung internationaler Investitionsabkommen und bei deren strikterer Ausgestaltung eine wesentliche Rolle gespielt. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert die empirische Evidenz zum Zusammenhang zwischen Demokratie und der Häufigkeit von Investitionsabkommen sowie der darin enthaltenen Regeln zur Nichtdiskriminierung und Streitschlichtung. Es zeigt sich, dass es Ökonomen und Politikwissenschaftlern bisher kaum gelungen ist, den häufig gefundenen positiven Zusammenhang zwischen Demokratie und internationalen Investitionsabkommen schlüssig zu erklären.

Suggested Citation

  • Nunnenkamp Peter, 2016. "Demokratie und internationale Investitionsabkommen: (Überraschende) Zusammenhänge und (lückenhafte) Erklärungen," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 17(4), pages 364-382, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pewipo:v:17:y:2016:i:4:p:364-382:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/pwp-2016-0028
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    F53; internationale Investitionsabkommen; Streitschlichtung; Demokratie; Autokratie;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations

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