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The Failure Of Financial Macroeconomics And What To Do About It

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  • JEAN-BERNARD CHATELAIN
  • KIRSTEN RALF

Abstract

The bargaining power of international banks is currently still very high as compared with what it was at the time of the Bretton Woods conference. As a consequence, systemic financial crises are likely to remain recurrent phenomena with large effects on macroeconomic aggregates. Mainstream macroeconomic models dealing with financial frictions failed to explain at least eight stylized facts of the ongoing crisis. We therefore suggest two complementary assumptions: (i) a systemic bankruptcy risk stable equilibrium may be feasible, and (ii) inefficient financial markets rarely ensure that the price of an asset is equal to its 'fundamental long-term value'.
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Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2012. "The Failure Of Financial Macroeconomics And What To Do About It," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 80, pages 21-53, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:manchs:v:80:y:2012:i::p:21-53
    DOI: j.1467-9957.2012.02327.x
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2012.02327.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Christophe Blot & Marion Cochard & Jérôme Creel & Bruno Ducoudré & Danielle Schweisguth & Xavier Timbeau, 2014. "Is There an Alternative Strategy for Reducing Public Debt by 2032?," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 61(1), pages 39-57, Februar.
    2. Azizi, Karim & Canry, Nicolas & Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Tinel, Bruno, 2013. "Government Solvency, Austerity and Fiscal Consolidation in the OECD: A Keynesian Appraisal of Transversality and No Ponzi Game Conditions," EconStor Preprints 72550, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
    3. Jean-Bernard Chatelain, 2013. "Goodhart, Charles A.E. and Tsomocos, Dimitros P.: The challenge of financial stability: a new model and its applications," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 109(2), pages 201-205, June.
    4. Christophe Blot & Marion Cochard & Jérôme Creel & Bruno Ducoudré & Danielle Schweisguth & Xavier Timbeau, 2014. "Fiscal Consolidation, Public Debt and Output Dynamics in the Euro Area: lessons from a simple model with time-varying fiscal multipliers," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 124(6), pages 953-989.
    5. Jean-Bernard, Chatelain, 2013. "Book review: “The Challenge of Financial Stability: A New Model and its Applications” by Goodhart C.A.E. and Tsomocos D.P," MPRA Paper 45678, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Karim Azizi & Nicolas Canry & Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Bruno Tinel, 2013. "Government Solvency, Austerity and Fiscal Consolidation in the OECD: A Keynesian Appraisal of Transversality and No Ponzi Game Conditions," Working Papers hal-00818474, HAL.
    7. Francesco Sergi, 2015. "L'histoire (faussement) naïve des modèles DSGE," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 15066, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    8. repec:pjm:journl:v:xxii:y:2017:i:1:p:3-23 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00825446 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Karim Azizi & Nicolas Canry & Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Bruno Tinel, 2012. "Are No-Ponzi Game and Transversality Conditions Relevant for Public Debt? A Keynesian Appraisal," Working Papers wp296, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
    11. Francesco Sergi, 2015. "L'histoire (faussement) naïve des modèles DSGE," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01222798, HAL.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates
    • E3 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles

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