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Are No-Ponzi Game and Transversality Conditions Relevant for Public Debt? A Keynesian Appraisal

Author

Listed:
  • Karim Azizi
  • Nicolas Canry
  • Jean-Bernard Chatelain
  • Bruno Tinel

Abstract

This paper investigates the relevance of the No-Ponzi game condition for public debt (i.e. the public debt growth rate has to be lower than the real interest rate) and the transversality condition for the GDP growth rate (i.e. the GDP growth rate has to be lower than the real interest rate). First, it appears in OECD data, that over the last 40 years, those conditions were validated only for 24% of the cases under examination. Second, the No-Ponzi and the transversality conditions were more frequent in the 1980s and the 1990s following changes towards more restrictive monetary policies. Third, in line with the Keynesian view, the data show that cases where the real interest rate is lower than the GDP growth rate may also lead to public debt consolidation (i.e. a decrease in the debt to GDP ratio) in 26% of the cases, compared with only 19% corresponding to the textbook case in which both GDP and public debt growth rates are below the interest rate.

Suggested Citation

  • Karim Azizi & Nicolas Canry & Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Bruno Tinel, 2012. "Are No-Ponzi Game and Transversality Conditions Relevant for Public Debt? A Keynesian Appraisal," Working Papers wp296, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
    • Handle: RePEc:uma:periwp:wp296
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2012. "The Failure Of Financial Macroeconomics And What To Do About It," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 80, pages 21-53, September.
    2. Sébastien Lechevalier & Pauline Debanes & Shin Wonkyu, 2016. "Financialization and industrial policies in Japan and Korea: Evolving complementarities and loss of institutional capabilities," Working Papers halshs-01431783, HAL.
    3. Lechevalier, Sébastien & Debanes, Pauline & Shin, Wonkyu, 2019. "Financialization and industrial policies in Japan and Korea: Evolving institutional complementarities and loss of state capabilities," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 69-85.
    4. Schilirò, Daniele, 2020. "COVID-19 crisis and the public debt issue:The case of Italy," MPRA Paper 103997, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Nov 2020.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public debt solvency; No-Ponzi Game condition; transversality condition; Keynesian countercyclical policy; monetary policy; economic growth;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt

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