IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/18922.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Bond Market Clienteles, the Yield Curve, and the Optimal Maturity Structure of Government Debt

Author

Listed:
  • Stéphane Guibaud
  • Yves Nosbusch
  • Dimitri Vayanos

Abstract

We propose a clientele-based model of the yield curve and optimal maturity structure of government debt. Clienteles are generations of agents at different lifecycle stages in an overlapping-generations economy. An optimal maturity structure exists in the absence of distortionary taxes and induces efficient intergenerational risksharing. If agents are more risk-averse than log, then an increase in the long-horizon clientele raises the price and optimal supply of long-term bonds--effects that we also confirm empirically in a panel of OECD countries. Moreover, under the optimal maturity structure, catering to clienteles is limited and long-term bonds earn negative expected excess returns.

Suggested Citation

  • Stéphane Guibaud & Yves Nosbusch & Dimitri Vayanos, 2013. "Bond Market Clienteles, the Yield Curve, and the Optimal Maturity Structure of Government Debt," NBER Working Papers 18922, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18922
    Note: AP IFM PE
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18922.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Campbell, John Y. & Nosbusch, Yves, 2007. "Intergenerational risksharing and equilibrium asset prices," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2251-2268, November.
    2. Dimitri Vayanos & Jean‐Luc Vila, 2021. "A Preferred‐Habitat Model of the Term Structure of Interest Rates," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(1), pages 77-112, January.
    3. Massimo BERNASCHI & Alessandro MISSALE & Davide VERGNI, 2009. "Should governments minimize debt service cost and risk? A closer look at the debt strategy. Simulation approach," Departmental Working Papers 2009-53, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    4. Barro, Robert J, 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1095-1117, Nov.-Dec..
    5. Antonio Rangel & Richard Zeckhauser, 2001. "Can Market and Voting Institutions Generate Optimal Intergenerational Risk Sharing?," NBER Chapters, in: Risk Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform, pages 113-152, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. J. M. Culbertson, 1957. "The Term Structure of Interest Rates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 485-517.
    7. Pierpaolo Benigno & Michael Woodford, 2004. "Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy: A Linear-Quadratic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003, Volume 18, pages 271-364, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Andrew Ang & Geert Bekaert & Min Wei, 2008. "The Term Structure of Real Rates and Expected Inflation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(2), pages 797-849, April.
    9. Stein, Jeremy C, 1996. "Rational Capital Budgeting in an Irrational World," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69(4), pages 429-455, October.
    10. Lustig, Hanno & Sleet, Christopher & Yeltekin, Sevin, 2008. "Fiscal hedging with nominal assets," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 710-727, May.
    11. Faraglia, Elisa & Marcet, Albert & Scott, Andrew, 2010. "In search of a theory of debt management," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(7), pages 821-836, October.
    12. Laurence Ball & N. Gregory Mankiw, 2007. "Intergenerational Risk Sharing in the Spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with Applications to Social Security Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(4), pages 523-547, August.
    13. Robin Greenwood & Dimitri Vayanos, 2014. "Bond Supply and Excess Bond Returns," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(3), pages 663-713.
    14. Weiss, Laurence M, 1980. "The Effects of Money Supply on Economic Welfare in the Steady State," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(3), pages 565-576, April.
    15. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-971, October.
    16. James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson, 2007. "Erratum to "Why Has U.S. Inflation Become Harder to Forecast?"," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(7), pages 1849-1849, October.
    17. Bohn, Henning, 1988. "Why do we have nominal government debt?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 127-140, January.
    18. Lucas, Robert Jr. & Stokey, Nancy L., 1983. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 55-93.
    19. Missale, Alessandro, 1999. "Public Debt Management," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198290858.
    20. George-Marios Angeletos, 2002. "Fiscal Policy with Noncontingent Debt and the Optimal Maturity Structure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(3), pages 1105-1131.
    21. Blanchard, Olivier J, 1985. "Debt, Deficits, and Finite Horizons," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(2), pages 223-247, April.
    22. James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson, 2007. "Why Has U.S. Inflation Become Harder to Forecast?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(s1), pages 3-33, February.
    23. S. Rao Aiyagari & Albert Marcet & Thomas J. Sargent & Juha Seppala, 2002. "Optimal Taxation without State-Contingent Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(6), pages 1220-1254, December.
    24. Bhattacharya, Sudipto, 1982. "Aspects of Monetary and Banking Theory and Moral Hazard," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(2), pages 371-384, May.
    25. Yves Nosbusch, 2008. "Interest Costs and the Optimal Maturity Structure Of Government Debt," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(527), pages 477-498, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Challe, Edouard & Le Grand, François & Ragot, Xavier, 2013. "Incomplete markets, liquidation risk, and the term structure of interest rates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2483-2519.
    2. Elisa Faraglia & Albert Marcet & Rigas Oikonomou & Andrew Scott, 2019. "Government Debt Management: The Long and the Short of It," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 86(6), pages 2554-2604.
    3. Ellison, Martin & Scott, Andrew, 2017. "Managing the UK National Debt 1694-2017," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86148, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Elisa Faraglia & Albert Marcet & Rigas Oikonomou & Andrew Scott, 2014. "Government Debt Management: The Long and the Short of It (Plus Appendix)," Working Papers 799, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    5. Luis Opazo & Claudio Raddatz & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2015. "Institutional Investors and Long-Term Investment: Evidence from Chile," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 29(3), pages 479-522.
    6. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes & Pierre Yared, 2018. "Optimal Fiscal Policy without Commitment: Beyond Lucas-Stokey," NBER Working Papers 24522, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Till Strohsal, 2013. "Testing the Preferred-Habitat Theory: The Role ofTime-Varying Risk Aversion," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2013-043, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    8. Howard Kung & Gonzalo Morales & Alexandre Corhay, 2017. "Fiscal Discount Rates and Debt Maturity," 2017 Meeting Papers 840, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    9. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes & Pierre Yared, 2019. "Optimal fiscal policy without commitment: Revisiting Lucas-Stokey," Economics Working Papers 1687, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2020.
    10. Dirk Niepelt, 2018. "Financial Policy," Diskussionsschriften dp1802, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    11. Yutaka Kurihara, 2016. "Term Structure of Interest Rates under Zero or Low Bound: The Recent Japanese Case," Economy, Asian Online Journal Publishing Group, vol. 3(1), pages 19-23.
    12. Dottori, Davide & Manna, Michele, 2016. "Strategy and tactics in public debt management," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-25.
    13. Fleckenstein, Matthias & Longstaff, Francis A., 2020. "The US Treasury floating rate note puzzle: Is there a premium for mark-to-market stability?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(3), pages 637-658.
    14. Jason Allen & Jakub Kastl & Milena Wittwer, 2020. "Primary Dealers and the Demand for Government Debt," Staff Working Papers 20-29, Bank of Canada.
    15. Bouakez, Hafedh & Oikonomou, Rigas & Priftis, Romanos, 2018. "Optimal debt management in a liquidity trap," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 5-21.
    16. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes & Pierre Yared, 2017. "Optimal Time-Consistent Government Debt Maturity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 132(1), pages 55-102.
    17. Driessen, Joost & Nijman, Theodore E. & Simon, Zorka, 2018. "Much ado about nothing: A study of differential pricing and liquidity of short and long term bonds," SAFE Working Paper Series 238, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    18. S. M. Ali Abbas & Laura Blattner & Mark De Broeck & Asmaa A ElGanainy & Malin Hu, 2014. "Sovereign Debt Composition in Advanced Economies; A Historical Perspective," IMF Working Papers 2014/162, International Monetary Fund.
    19. Challe, Edouard & Le Grand, François & Ragot, Xavier, 2013. "Incomplete markets, liquidation risk, and the term structure of interest rates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2483-2519.
    20. Ulrike Malmendier, 2018. "Behavioral Corporate Finance," NBER Working Papers 25162, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Basil Guggenheim & Mario Meichle & Thomas Nellen, 2019. "Confederation debt management since 1970," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, vol. 155(1), pages 1-23, December.
    2. Johannes Holler, 2013. "Funding Strategies of Sovereign Debt Management: A Risk Focus," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 2, pages 51-74.
    3. Leeper, E.M. & Leith, C., 2016. "Understanding Inflation as a Joint Monetary–Fiscal Phenomenon," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 2305-2415, Elsevier.
    4. Faraglia, Elisa & Marcet, Albert & Scott, Andrew, 2014. "Modelling Long Bonds - The Case of Optimal Fiscal Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 9965, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Bouakez, Hafedh & Oikonomou, Rigas & Priftis, Romanos, 2018. "Optimal debt management in a liquidity trap," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 5-21.
    6. Niepelt, Dirk, 2014. "Debt maturity without commitment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(S), pages 37-54.
    7. Niepelt, Dirk, 2018. "Financial Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 12755, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes & Pierre Yared, 2017. "Optimal Time-Consistent Government Debt Maturity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 132(1), pages 55-102.
    9. Marcet, Albert & Scott, Andrew, 2009. "Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 473-501, March.
    10. Ellison, Martin & Scott, Andrew, 2017. "Managing the UK National Debt 1694-2017," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86148, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    11. Massimo BERNASCHI & Alessandro MISSALE & Davide VERGNI, 2009. "Should governments minimize debt service cost and risk? A closer look at the debt strategy. Simulation approach," Departmental Working Papers 2009-53, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    12. Dottori, Davide & Manna, Michele, 2016. "Strategy and tactics in public debt management," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-25.
    13. Alessandro Missale, 2012. "Sovereign debt management and fiscal vulnerabilities," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Threat of fiscal dominance?, volume 65, pages 157-176, Bank for International Settlements.
    14. Robert Barro, 2003. "Optimal Management of Indexed and Nominal Debt," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 4(1), pages 1-15, May.
    15. Faraglia, Elisa & Marcet, Albert & Scott, Andrew, 2010. "In search of a theory of debt management," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(7), pages 821-836, October.
    16. Equiza-Goni, Juan & Faraglia, Elisa & Oikonomou, Rigas, 2016. "Union Debt Management," CEPR Discussion Papers 11181, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Fatás, Antonio & Ghosh, Atish & Panizza, Ugo & Presbitero, Andrea, 2019. "The Motives to Borrow," CEPR Discussion Papers 13735, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Eidam, Frederik, 2018. "Gap-filling government debt maturity choice," ZEW Discussion Papers 18-025, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    19. Eidam, Frederik, 2020. "Gap-filling government debt maturity choice," ESRB Working Paper Series 110, European Systemic Risk Board.
    20. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2006. "Modern Macroeconomics in Practice: How Theory Is Shaping Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 3-28, Fall.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18922. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.