On A Consumer-Based Emission Tax Policy
Based on a model of environmental quality differentiated products, we explore how an emission tax charged on consumers who choose an environment-unfriendly good, i.e. a consumer-based emission tax policy, affects the unit emission level of the product, the environment, and consumer and producer surplus. Then, we analyse the conditions for an optimal consumer-based emission tax rate to exist and the properties of the optimal tax rate. We address these issues in the case of a partial coverage market with a Bertrand duopoly. Furthermore, we discuss some of the assumptions of the model. Copyright © 2010 The Author. The Manchester School © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester.
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Volume (Year): 78 (2010)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
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