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Fiscal Federalism and Legislative Malapportionment: Causal Evidence from Independent but Related Natural Experiments

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  • Sebastian Galiani
  • Iván Torre
  • Gustavo Torrens

Abstract

We exploit three natural experiments in Argentina in order to study the role of legislative malapportionment on the biased federal tax sharing scheme prevalent in the country. We do not find support to attribute it to legislative malapportionment during periods when democratic governments were in place; nor did we find any evidence that the tax sharing distribution pattern became less biased under centralized military governments. We argue that these results are attributable to two of Argentina's institutional characteristics: first, the predominance of the executive branch over the legislature; and, second, the lack of any significant difference in the pattern of geographic representation in the executive branch under democratic and autocratic governments. Thus, the observed biases in the distribution of tax revenues among the Argentine provinces are not caused by legislative malapportionment, but are instead the result of a more structural political equilibrium that transcends the geographic distribution of legislative representation and even the nature of the political regime. Our findings also illustrate the importance of informal institutions and the interactions between formal and informal institutions. Legislative malapportionment could have an innocuous influence in countries with a strong executive branch but could become a key factor in countries with an empowered Congress.
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  • Sebastian Galiani & Iván Torre & Gustavo Torrens, 2016. "Fiscal Federalism and Legislative Malapportionment: Causal Evidence from Independent but Related Natural Experiments," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 133-159, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:28:y:2016:i:1:p:133-159
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecpo.12074
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    Cited by:

    1. Jorge M. Streb, 2018. "Tributación sin representación: la democracia argentina desde 1983," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 633, Universidad del CEMA.
    2. repec:spr:ecogov:v:18:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10101-017-0196-6 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents

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