IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/anr/reseco/v1y2009p287-307.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Rent Taxation for Nonrenewable Resources

Author

Listed:
  • Diderik Lund

    () (Department of Economics, University of Oslo, NO–0317 Oslo, Norway)

Abstract

The literature on taxation of rents from nonrenewable resources uses different theoretical assumptions and methods and a variety of empirical observations to arrive at widely diverging conclusions. Many studies use models and methods that disregard uncertainty, investigating distortionary effects of different taxes on whether, when, and how to explore for, develop, and operate resource deposits. Introducing uncertainty into the analysis opens a range of challenges and leads to results that cast doubt on the relevance of studies that neglect uncertainty. There are, however, several ways to analyze uncertainty regarding companies' behavior, resource price processes, and diversification opportunities, all with different implications for taxation. Methods developed in financial economics since the 1980s, though promising, are still not in widespread use. Additional topics covered in this review are optimal risk sharing between companies and governments, time consistency and fiscal stability, the relationship between taxes and discount rates, tax competition, and transfer pricing.

Suggested Citation

  • Diderik Lund, 2009. "Rent Taxation for Nonrenewable Resources," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 287-307, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:anr:reseco:v:1:y:2009:p:287-307
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.resource.050708.144216
    Download Restriction: Full text downloads are only available to subscribers. Visit the abstract page for more information.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sumner, M T, 1978. "Progressive Taxation of Natural Resource Rents," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 46(1), pages 1-16, March.
    2. Lund, Diderik, 2002. "Rent taxation when cost monitoring is imperfect," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 211-228, June.
    3. Paul G. Bradley, 1998. "On the Use of Modern Asset Pricing for Comparing Alternative Royalty Systems for Petroleum Development Projects," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 47-81.
    4. Margaret E. Slade & Henry Thille, 2009. "Whither Hotelling: Tests of the Theory of Exhaustible Resources," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 239-259, September.
    5. Boadway, Robin & Bruce, Neil, 1984. "A general proposition on the design of a neutral business tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 231-239, July.
    6. Gaudet, Gerard & Lasserre, Pierre, 1986. "Capital income taxation, depletion allowances, and nonrenewable resource extraction," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 241-253, March.
    7. Graham, John R. & Harvey, Campbell R., 2001. "The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2-3), pages 187-243, May.
    8. Mackie-Mason, Jeffrey K., 1990. "Some nonlinear tax effects on asset values and investment decisions under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 301-327, August.
    9. Charles R. Blitzer & Donald R. Lessard & James L. Paddock, 1984. "Risk-Bearing and the Choice of Contract Forms for Oil Exploration and Development," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 1-28.
    10. Lund Diderik, 1993. "The Lognormal Diffusion Is Hardly an Equilibrium Price Process for Exhaustible Resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 235-241, November.
    11. Zhang, Lei, 1997. "Neutrality and Efficiency of Petroleum Revenue Tax: A Theoretical Assessment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1106-1120, July.
    12. Groth, Christian & Schou, Poul, 2007. "Growth and non-renewable resources: The different roles of capital and resource taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 80-98, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Smith, James L., 2013. "Issues in extractive resource taxation: A review of research methods and models," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 320-331.
    2. Berg, Magnus & Bøhren, Øyvind & Vassnes, Erik, 2018. "Modeling the response to exogenous shocks: The capital uplift rate in petroleum taxation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 442-455.
    3. Celine de Quatrebarbes & Bertrand Laporte, 2015. "What do we know about the mineral resource rent sharing in Africa?," Working Papers halshs-01146279, HAL.
    4. Malafeh, Sam & Sharp, Basil, 2015. "Role of royalties in sustainable geothermal energy development," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 235-242.
    5. Jean-François Wen, 2018. "Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy," IMF Working Papers 18/130, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Lars Lindholt, 2019. "Effects of higher required rates of return on the tax take in an oil province," Discussion Papers 892, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    7. Lund, Diderik, 2009. "Marginal versus Average Beta of Equity under Corporate Taxation," Memorandum 12/2009, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    8. Frestad, Dennis, 2010. "Corporate hedging under a resource rent tax regime," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 458-468, March.
    9. Jaakkola, Niko & Spiro, Daniel & van Benthem, Arthur A., 2019. "Finders, keepers?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 17-33.
    10. Dobra, John & Dobra, Matt, 2013. "State mineral production taxes and mining law reform," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 162-168.
    11. Laporte, Bertrand & de Quatrebarbes, Céline, 2015. "What do we know about the sharing of mineral resource rent in Africa?," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(P2), pages 239-249.
    12. Alexeev, Michael & Conrad, Robert F., 2017. "Income equivalence and a proposed resource rent charge," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 349-359.
    13. Bertrand Laporte & Céline de Quatrebarbes & Yannick Bouterige, 2019. "Rent sharing and progressivity of tax regimes in the mining sector: An analysis of 21 African gold-producing countries [Partage de la rente et progressivité des régimes fiscaux dans le secteur mini," Working Papers halshs-02103047, HAL.
    14. Smith, James L., 2014. "A parsimonious model of tax avoidance and distortions in petroleum exploration and development," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 140-157.
    15. Emilio Castillo, 2020. "The Impacts of Profit-Based Royalties in Early-Stage Mineral Exploration," Working Papers 2020-05, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business, revised Nov 2020.
    16. Lund, Diderik, 2018. "Increasing resource rent taxation when the corporate income tax is reduced?," Memorandum 3/2018, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    17. Söderholm, Patrik & Svahn, Nanna, 2015. "Mining, regional development and benefit-sharing in developed countries," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 78-91.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    natural resources; rent tax; royalty; oil; minerals; energy;

    JEL classification:

    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:anr:reseco:v:1:y:2009:p:287-307. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (http://www.annualreviews.org). General contact details of provider: http://www.annualreviews.org .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.