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Percepcja korupcji na poziomie przedsiębiorstw w krajach postkomunistycznych

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  • Cieślik, Andrzej
  • Goczek, Łukasz

Abstract

The article looks at how Polish firms view corruption and whether they see it as a major obstacle to doing business. The authors investigate the relationship between the characteristic features of firms and their perception of corruption. The authors examine the findings of previous studies in the field. They conduct an empirical analysis using panel data on 25,000 firms in 27 postcommunist countries from 1999 to 2010. The research makes it possible to identify companies for which corruption is a major obstacle to doing business. The authors conclude that corruption is especially troublesome for companies producing goods for the domestic market and for private companies based on domestic capital. The study also finds that corruption poses a problem to companies regardless of their efficiency and size. The authors’ key recommendation for economic policy makers is that they should depersonalize businesses’ contacts with the government administration and reduce their frequency.

Suggested Citation

  • Cieślik, Andrzej & Goczek, Łukasz, 2015. "Percepcja korupcji na poziomie przedsiębiorstw w krajach postkomunistycznych," Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie / SGH Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 2015(2), April.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:polgne:358796
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.358796
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(4), pages 559-594, December.
    2. Jakob Svensson, 2003. "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 207-230.
    3. Hunt, Jennifer, 2007. "How corruption hits people when they are down," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 574-589, November.
    4. Łukasz Goczek, 2007. "Przyczyny korupcji i skuteczność strategii antykorupcyjnych," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 4, pages 33-48.
    5. Knack, Stephen, 2007. "Measuring Corruption: A Critique of Indicators in Eastern Europe and Central Asia," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 255-291, December.
    6. Simon Johnson & Daniel Kaufmann & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 2007. "Why Do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity after Communism," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Erik Berglöf & Gérard Roland (ed.), The Economics of Transition, chapter 10, pages 335-359, Palgrave Macmillan.
    7. Fisman, Raymond & Svensson, Jakob, 2007. "Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 63-75, May.
    8. Olken, Benjamin A., 2009. "Corruption perceptions vs. corruption reality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(7-8), pages 950-964, August.
    9. Andreas Buehn & Friedrich Schneider, 2012. "Corruption and the shadow economy: like oil and vinegar, like water and fire?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(1), pages 172-194, February.
    10. Braguinsky, Serguey & Mityakov, Sergey, 2015. "Foreign corporations and the culture of transparency: Evidence from Russian administrative data," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 139-164.
    11. Mr. Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Working Papers 1998/063, International Monetary Fund.
    12. Joel Hellman & Mark Schankerman, 2000. "Intervention, Corruption and Capture: The Nexus between Enterprises and the State," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 8(3), pages 545-576, November.
    13. Chavis, Larry, 2013. "Social networks and bribery: The case of entrepreneurs in Eastern Europe," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 279-293.
    14. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-781, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrzej Cieślik & Łukasz Goczek, 2015. "Corruption and Export Performance in Post-communist Countries: Evidence from Firm-level Data," Ekonomia journal, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, vol. 42.
    2. Bąk Paulina, 2020. "Economic analysis of corruption at the company level," Central European Economic Journal, Sciendo, vol. 7(54), pages 186-204, January.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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