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W stronę rozszerzenia Europejskiego Banku Centralnego

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  • Stanek, Piotr

Abstract

The article presents certain drawbacks of the present decision-making system of the European Central Bank (ECB), in particular in the context of the possible entry of new countries into the euro area. It also illustrates the main scenarios of the ECB reform, as proposed in economic writings, pointing out their drawbacks and advantages. In this context, the official proposal of the reform, put forward by the ECB Governing Council is discussed, along with the progress of the legislative procedure involved with the reform. Besides, serious reservations about this proposals voiced by leading economists are taken account of. They cover, inter alia, the issues of transparency and accountability to democratic institutions, as well as the alleged lack of a serious improvement of the ECB decision-making process upon enlargement of the Economic and Monetary Union. The article also presents main theoretical considerations involved with the decision-making system of the central bank with a federal structure, in particular based on the theory of time inconsistency of decisions concerning monetary policy. The problem of making decisions within committees with a federal structure, composed of persons with heterogeneous preferences or skills, was addressed as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Stanek, Piotr, 2004. "W stronę rozszerzenia Europejskiego Banku Centralnego," Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie / SGH Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 2004(10), October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:polgne:355492
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.355492
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Piotr Stanek, 2004. "How to assess proposals for enlargement reform of the European Central Bank," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 91(5), pages 209-239.
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    7. Berk, J.M. & Bierut, B.K., 2003. "Committee structure and its implications for monetary policy decision-making," Serie Research Memoranda 0006, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
    8. Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2003. "Committee Structure and its Implications for Monetary Policy Decision-making," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-053/2, Tinbergen Institute.
    9. von Hagen, Jurgen & Suppel, Ralph, 1994. "Central bank constitutions for federal monetary unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 774-782, April.
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