IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpma/0309014.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The role of regional information in the optimal composition of a committee

Author

Listed:
  • Philipp Maier

    (The Netherlands Central Bank)

  • Beata K. Bierut

    (The Netherlands Central Bank)

  • Robert-Paul Berben

    (The Netherlands Central Bank)

Abstract

In this paper we present a model for the optimal composition of a federal or supra-national committee. The involvement of regional (national) entities in federal committees is typically motivated by their knowledge of regional information about the state of the economy. Using this argument we show that if the uncertainties regarding the state of the economy are not evenly distributed across the currency area, the optimal representation of regions in the federal committee increases with the overall uncertainty about their economic performance. Second, if certain parts of the economic area behave in a relatively synchronized way, it may not be necessary that all these regions are equally represented in the federal committee.

Suggested Citation

  • Philipp Maier & Beata K. Bierut & Robert-Paul Berben, 2003. "The role of regional information in the optimal composition of a committee," Macroeconomics 0309014, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0309014 Note: Type of Document - LaTeX
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/mac/papers/0309/0309014.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Carsten Hefeker, 2003. "Federal Monetary Policy," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, pages 643-659.
    3. Marvin Goodfriend, 2000. "The role of a regional bank in a system of central banks," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 7-25.
    4. Nout Wellink & Bryan Chapple & Philipp Maier, 2002. "The role of national central banks within the European System of Central Banks: The example of De Nederlandsche Bank," Macroeconomics 0207006, EconWPA.
    5. Meade, Ellen E & Sheets, D Nathan, 2005. "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 661-677, August.
    6. Casella, Alessandra, 1992. "Participation in a Currency Union," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 847-863.
    7. Bottazzi, Laura & Manasse, Paolo, 2005. "Asymmetric Information and Monetary Policy in Common Currency Areas," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 603-621, August.
    8. M.A. Akhtar & Howard Howe, 1991. "The political and institutional independence of U.S. monetary policy," Research Paper 9110, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    9. Friedrich Heinemann & Felix P. Huefner, 2004. "Is The View From The Eurotower Purely European? - National Divergence And Ecb Interest Rate Policy," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 51(4), pages 544-558, September.
    10. Ellen E. Meade & Nathan Sheets, 2002. "Regional influences on U.S. monetary policy: some implications for Europe," International Finance Discussion Papers 721, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    11. Ullrich, Katrin, 2004. "Decision-Making of the ECB: Reform and Voting Power," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-70, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    12. von Hagen, Jurgen & Suppel, Ralph, 1994. "Central bank constitutions for federal monetary unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 774-782, April.
    13. Helge Berger, 2002. "The ECB and Euro-Area Enlargement," IMF Working Papers 02/175, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal central bank design: Benchmarks for the ECB," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 207-235, September.
    2. Helge Berger & Till Mueller, 2007. "How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 471-484, September.
    3. Piotr Stanek, 2004. "How to assess proposals for enlargement reform of the European Central Bank," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 91(5), pages 209-239.
    4. Helge Berger, 2006. "Unfinished business? The ECB reform ahead of euro area enlargement," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 7(4), pages 35-41, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Composition of a committee; currency union; optimal representation; information uncertainty;

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0309014. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA). General contact details of provider: http://econwpa.repec.org .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.