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The role of regional information in the optimal composition of a committee

  • Robert-Paul Berben


    (De Nederlandsche Bank)

  • Beata Bierut


    (De Nederlandsche Bank)

  • Philipp Maier


    (Bank of America)

We analyse the optimal composition of a committee comprising members that have private information and represent constituencies of different economic sizes. ‘Proportional representation' - i.e. each constituency represented proportionally to its economic weight - seems intuitively appealing, but as we demonstrate, the optimal committee composition is more complex. We show that representation in a committee depends also on (i) the ‘intrinsic' uncertainty of the available data, (ii) constituency's degree of sectoral specialization, and (iii) the extent to which economic developments are correlated between constituencies.

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Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 32 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 510-517

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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00135
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  9. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
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