The role of regional information in the optimal composition of a committee
We analyse the optimal composition of a committee comprising members that have private information and represent constituencies of different economic sizes. ‘Proportional representation' - i.e. each constituency represented proportionally to its economic weight - seems intuitively appealing, but as we demonstrate, the optimal committee composition is more complex. We show that representation in a committee depends also on (i) the ‘intrinsic' uncertainty of the available data, (ii) constituency's degree of sectoral specialization, and (iii) the extent to which economic developments are correlated between constituencies.
Volume (Year): 32 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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