Flexible Majority Rules for Central Banks
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Other versions of this item:
- Hans Gersbach & Bernhard Pachl, 2009. "Flexible Majority Rules for Central Banks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2‐3), pages 507-516, March.
- Gersbach, Hans & Pachl, Bernhard, 2004. "Flexible Majority Rules for Central Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 4398, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Charemza, Wojciech, 2020. "Central banks' voting contest," MPRA Paper 101205, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hans Gersbach, 2024. "Forms of new democracy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 62(4), pages 799-837, June.
- Helge Berger, 2006.
"Optimal central bank design: Benchmarks for the ECB,"
The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 207-235, September.
- Berger, Helge, 2005. "Optimal central bank design: benchmarks for the ECB," Discussion Papers 2005/27, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal Central Bank Design: Benchmarks for the ECB," CESifo Working Paper Series 1697, CESifo.
- Helge Berger & Till Mueller, 2007.
"How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 471-484, September.
- Berger, Helge & Müller, Till, 2004. "How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?," Discussion Papers 2004/20, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Helge Berger & Till Mueller, 2004. "How Should Large and Small Countries Be Represented in a Currency Union?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1344, CESifo.
- Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2011.
"Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy,"
Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(2), pages 452-475, October.
- Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker, 2008. "Too many cooks? Committees in monetary policy," Discussion Papers 2008/8, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2008. "Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," KOF Working papers 08-195, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
- Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2008. "Too many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 2274, CESifo.
- Nitsch, Volker & Berger, Helge, 2011. "Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 55742, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
- Gersbach, Hans, 2017. "Flexible Majority Rules in democracyville: A guided tour," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 37-43.
- Vollmer Uwe, 2004. "Wer entscheidet über Leitzinssatzänderungen?: Zur optimalen Verfassung des Zentralbankrats in einer Währungsunion," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 55(1), pages 287-312, January.
- Hans Gersbach, 2022. "New Forms of Democracy," CESifo Working Paper Series 10134, CESifo.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
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