Limiting Buyer Discretion: Effects on Performance and Price in Long-Term Contracts
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More about this item
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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