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Curbing Agency Problems in the Procurement Process by Protest Oversight

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  • Robert C. Marshall
  • Michael J. Meurer
  • Jean-Francois Richard

Abstract

We study a model in which a potential bidder in a government procurement may challenge its exclusion from the procurement before a quasi-judicial board. In the case of a sole-source procurement, the excluded vendor does not know whether the decision was justified in terms of expected surplus or, alternatively, was due to an agency problem. We explain the occurrence of (i) equilibrium protests, (ii) deterrence of inefficient sole sourcing, (iii) overdeterrence (the choice of a competitive procurement when sole source would be appropriate), (iv) "buyoff" settlements (which preserve inappropriate sole-source procurement) and (v) "fedmail" settlements (which accompany appropriate sole-source procurements). Our normative analysis addresses recent legislative initiatives to reform the protest process.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert C. Marshall & Michael J. Meurer & Jean-Francois Richard, 1994. "Curbing Agency Problems in the Procurement Process by Protest Oversight," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(2), pages 297-318, Summer.
    • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:25:y:1994:i:summer:p:297-318
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    Cited by:

    1. Moszoro, Marian W. & Spiller, Pablo T., 2014. "Third-Party Opportunism and the Theory of Public Contracts: Operationalization and Applications," MPRA Paper 101592, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Marian W. Moszoro, 2018. "Tools and approaches in public contracting research," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley (ed.), A Research Agenda for New Institutional Economics, chapter 10, pages 88-96, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Martin K. Perry & József Sákovics, 2003. "Auctions for Split‐Award Contracts," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(2), pages 215-242, June.
    4. Aaditya Mattoo, 1996. "The Government Procurement Agreement: Implications of Economic Theory," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(6), pages 695-720, November.
    5. Ganuza, Juan-Jose & Hauk, Esther, 2004. "Economic integration and corruption," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(10), pages 1463-1484, December.
    6. Marian W. Moszoro & Pablo T. Spiller, 2019. "Political contestability and public contracting," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(5), pages 945-966, October.
    7. Steven Shavell, 2006. "The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 1-29, January.
    8. Lisa J. Cameron, 2000. "Limiting Buyer Discretion: Effects on Performance and Price in Long-Term Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 265-281, March.
    9. Keith Hylton & Sungjoon Cho, 2013. "Injunctive and reverse settlements in competition-blocking litigation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 243-269, October.
    10. Marian W. Moszoro & Pablo T. Spiller, 2012. "Third-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts," NBER Working Papers 18636, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Steven Shavell, 2004. "The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives," NBER Working Papers 10754, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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