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Citations for "Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory"

by Garen, John E

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Cited by (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.):
  1. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, 1998. "Value at risk and precommitment: approaches to market risk regulation," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 137-143. [Downloadable!]
  2. James Ang & Beni Lauterbach & Ben Schreiber, 2000. "Pay at the Executive Suite: How do U.S. Banks Compensate their Top Management Teams?," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management 1064, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ralph P. Heinrich, 2000. "Complementarities in Corporate Governance: Ownership Concentration, Capital Structure, Monitoring and Pecuniary Incentives," Kiel Working Papers 968, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
  4. John M. Abowd & David S. Kaplan, 1999. "Executive Compensation: Six Questions That Need Answering," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 145-168, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, 2006. "CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation," NBER Working Papers 12068, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Daniel Parent, 2001. "Incentive Pay in the United States: Its Determinants and Its Effects," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-04, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  7. Cowling, Marc, 2007. "Performance Related Pay Coverage in the UK," MPRA Paper 1619, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  8. Czarnitzki, Dirk & Kraft, Kornelius, 2000. "Management Control and Innovative Activity," ZEW Discussion Papers 00-68, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  9. John M. Abowd & Felipe Balmaceda & David Kaplan., . "Accounting Profits, Market Profits, and the Compensation of Regular Employees," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv119, Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines. [Downloadable!]
  10. George P. Baker & Brian J. Hall, 1998. "CEO Incentives and Firm Size," NBER Working Papers 6868, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Ying Yan, 1998. "The FDICIA and bank CEOs' pay-performance relationship: an empirical investigation," Working Paper 9805, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
  12. Scott W. Barnhart & Michael F. Spivey & John C. Alexander, 2000. "Do firm and state antitakeover provisions affect how well CEOs earn their pay?," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(8), pages 315-328. [Downloadable!]
  13. repec:fth:prinin:431 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Canice Prendergast, 1996. "What Happens Within Firms? A Survey of Empirical Evidence on Compensation Policies," NBER Working Papers 5802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Alberto Bayo-Moriones & Pedro Ortín-Ángel, 2003. "Internal promotion versus external recruitment: evidence in industrial plants," Working Papers 200303, Department of Business Economics, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. [Downloadable!]
  16. Christine Jolls, 1998. "Stock Repurchases and Incentive Compensation," NBER Working Papers 6467, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Benjamin Campbell, 2003. "Firm Volatility and Stock Option Incidence," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series 1093, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
  18. David A. Butz, 1999. "The Disconnection Between Principal-Agent Theory and Empirical Work: A Review of Bernard Salanie, The Economics of Contracts," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 6(1), pages 131-140, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Gerald T. Garvey & Todd T. Milbourn, 2000. "The Optimal and Actual Use of EVA versus Earnings in Actual Compensation," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2000-53, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  20. Gary Gorton & Bruce D. Grundy, 1996. "Executive Compensation and the Optimality of Managerial Entrenchment," NBER Working Papers 5779, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Koyin Chang & John Garen, 2004. "Residual income claimancy, monitoring, and the R&D firm: Theory with application to biotechs," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(8), pages 489-507. [Downloadable!]
  22. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2000. "Do CEOs Set Their Own Pay? The Ones Without Principals Do," Working Papers 810, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
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  23. Gerald Marschke, . "Performance Incentives and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence from a Federal Bureaucracy," Discussion Papers 02-07, State University of New York at Albany, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  24. David Nash, 2003. "Determinants of the use of financial incentives in investment banking," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp256, ESRC Centre for Business Research. [Downloadable!]
  25. Nellie Liang & Scott Weisbenner, 2001. "Who benefits from a bull market? an analysis of employee stock option grants and stock prices," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-57, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  26. Habib, Michel Antoine & Ljungqvist, Alexander P, 2000. "Firm Value and Managerial Incentives: A Stochastic Frontier Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 2564, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  27. Daniel Parent, 2001. "The Effect of Pay-for-Performance Contracts on Wages," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-05, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  28. Naohito Abe & Noel Gaston & Katsuyuki Kubo, 2001. "Executive Pay in Japan : The Role of Bank-Appointed Monitors and the Main BankRelationship," CEI Working Paper Series 2001-10, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
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  29. Gerald T. Garvey & Todd T. Milbourn, 2003. "Asymmetric Benchmarking in Compensation: Executives are Paid for (Good) Luck But Not Punished for Bad," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2003-01, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  30. Lionel Martellini & Branko Urosevic, 2003. "On the Valuation and Incentive Effects of Executive Cash Bonus Contracts," Economics Working Papers 784, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  31. Bruce A. Rayton, 1996. "Rent-Sharing or Incentives? Estimating the Residual Claim of Average Employees," Labor and Demography 9603002, EconWPA, revised 09 Sep 1996. [Downloadable!]
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  32. Gerald T. Garvey & Todd T. Milbourn, 2000. "EVA versus Earnings: Does it Matter which is More Highly Correlated with Stock Returns?," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2000-52, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  33. Rajesh Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1998. "The Other Side of the Tradeoff: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation," NBER Working Papers 6634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  34. Li, Fei & Ueda, Masako, 2005. "CEO-Firm Match and Principal-Agent Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 5119, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  35. Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2000. "Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment," Economics Working Papers 478, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  36. Chongwoo Choe, 2001. "Optimal Executive Compensation: Some Equivalence Results," Discussion Paper Series a419, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2008-11-22.


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