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Incentive Pay in the United States: Its Determinants and Its Effects

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  • Daniel Parent

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  • Daniel Parent, 2001. "Incentive Pay in the United States: Its Determinants and Its Effects," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-04, CIRANO.
    • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2001s-04
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    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2001s-04.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Mari Kangasniemi & Antti Kauhanen, 2013. "Performance-related pay and gender wage differences," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(36), pages 5131-5143, December.
    2. Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes," IZA Discussion Papers 844, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Dirk Sliwka, 2007. "Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 999-1012, June.
    4. Mari Kangasniemi, 2012. "Job satisfaction and wage dispersion," Working Papers 278, Työn ja talouden tutkimus LABORE, The Labour Institute for Economic Research LABORE.

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    Keywords

    Incentives; contract form; United States; Incitations; forme des contrats; États-Unis;
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