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Indexed executive stock options

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  • Johnson, Shane A.
  • Tian, Yisong S.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

Volume (Year): 57 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 35-64

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:57:y:2000:i:1:p:35-64

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576

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References

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  1. Barro, Jason R & Barro, Robert J, 1990. "Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(4), pages 448-81, October.
  2. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(3), pages 30-51, February.
  3. Fudenberg, Drew & Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1990. "Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-31, June.
  4. DeFusco, Richard A & Johnson, Robert R & Zorn, Thomas S, 1990. " The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(2), pages 617-27, June.
  5. Hemmer, Thomas & Matsunaga, Steve & Shevlin, Terry, 1996. "The influence of risk diversification on the early exercise of employee stock options by executive officers," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 45-68, February.
  6. Garen, John E, 1994. "Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1175-99, December.
  7. Margrabe, William, 1978. "The Value of an Option to Exchange One Asset for Another," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 33(1), pages 177-86, March.
  8. Bengt Holmstrom, 1997. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1205, David K. Levine.
  9. Huddart, Steven & Lang, Mark, 1996. "Employee stock option exercises an empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 5-43, February.
  10. Comment, Robert & Jarrell, Gregg A., 1995. "Corporate focus and stock returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 67-87, January.
  11. Berger, Philip G. & Ofek, Eli, 1995. "Diversification's effect on firm value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 39-65, January.
  12. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-28, March.
  13. Lang, Larry H P & Stulz, Rene M, 1994. "Tobin's q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1248-80, December.
  14. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April.
  15. Fischer, Stanley, 1978. "Call Option Pricing when the Exercise Price Is Uncertain, and the Valuation of Index Bonds," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 33(1), pages 169-76, March.
  16. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
  17. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999. "Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(6), pages 1999-2043, December.
  18. Brickley, James A. & Bhagat, Sanjai & Lease, Ronald C., 1985. "The impact of long-range managerial compensation plans on shareholder wealth," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 115-129, April.
  19. Haugen, Robert A & Senbet, Lemma W, 1981. "Resolving the Agency Problems of External Capital through Options," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(3), pages 629-47, June.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Jenter, Dirk, 2004. "Executive Compensation, Incentives, and Risk," Working papers 4466-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  2. Takahiko Fujita & Masahiro Ishii, 2010. "Valuation of a Repriceable Executive Stock Option," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 1-18, March.
  3. Duan, Jin-Chuan & Wei, Jason, 2005. "Executive stock options and incentive effects due to systematic risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 1185-1211, May.
  4. Palmon, Oded & Bar-Yosef, Sasson & Chen, Ren-Raw & Venezia, Itzhak, 2008. "Optimal strike prices of stock options for effort-averse executives," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 229-239, February.
  5. Muurling, Rutger & Lehnert, Thorsten, 2004. "Option-based compensation: a survey," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 365-401.
  6. Henrik CRONQVIST & Rüdiger FAHLENBRACH, . "CEO Contract Design: How Do Strong Principals Do It?," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 11-14, Swiss Finance Institute.
  7. Gerald T. Garvey & Todd T. Milbourn, 2001. "Market-Indexed Executive Compensation: Strictly for the Young," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2001-19, Claremont Colleges.
  8. Andrea Melis & Silvia Carta & Silvia Gaia, 2012. "Executive remuneration in blockholder-dominated firms. How do Italian firms use stock options?," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 511-541, August.
  9. Darsinos, T. & Satchell, S.E., 2002. "On the Valuation of Warrants and Executive Stock Options: Pricing Formulae for Firms with Multiple Warrants/Executive Options," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0218, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  10. Tian, Yisong S., 2013. "Ironing out the kinks in executive compensation: Linking incentive pay to average stock prices," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 415-432.
  11. Tiscini, Riccardo & Raoli, Elisa, 2013. "Stock option plan practices in family firms: The idiosyncratic private benefits approach," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 93-105.
  12. Radnai, Márton, 2005. "Indexált alaptermék árú opciók
    [Indexed options based on the underlying price]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 130-143.
  13. Brian J. Hall, 2003. "Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay," NBER Working Papers 9887, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Choe, Chongwoo, 2001. "Maturity and exercise price of executive stock options," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 227-250.
  15. Li, Minqiang & Deng, Shijie & Zhou, Jieyun, 2008. "Multi-asset Spread Option Pricing and Hedging," MPRA Paper 8259, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Johnson, Shane A. & Tian, Yisong S., 2000. "The value and incentive effects of nontraditional executive stock option plans," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 3-34, July.
  17. Len, Angel & Vaello-Sebasti, Antoni, 2009. "American GARCH employee stock option valuation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1129-1143, June.
  18. León, Angel & Vaello-Sebastià, Antoni, 2010. "A simulation-based algorithm for American executive stock option valuation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 14-23, March.
  19. Blenman, Lloyd P. & Clark, Steven P., 2005. "Power exchange options," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 97-106, June.
  20. Tang, Chun-Hua, 2012. "Revisiting the incentive effects of executive stock options," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 564-574.
  21. Lionel Martellini & Branko Urosevic, 2003. "On the valuation and incentive effects of executive cash bonus contracts," Economics Working Papers 784, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  22. Véronique Bon & Corinne Gourmel-Rouget, 2003. "Politique d’attribution différenciée de stock options : analyse des conflits d’intérêts induits et de leurs modes de résolution - Cas d’Alcatel," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 72(3), pages 317-336.

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