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The FDICIA and bank CEOs' pay-performance relationship: an empirical investigation

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Author Info
Ying Yan
Abstract

A look at how the FDICIA changes the relationship between pay and performance for bank CEOs. It finds that the legislation improves healthy banks’ growth opportunities, making their CEOs’ total compensation less sensitive to performance. For unhealthy banks, total compensation becomes more performance-sensitive.

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File URL: http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1998/wp9805.pdf
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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its series Working Paper with number 9805.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9805

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Keywords: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 ; Executives - Salaries;

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Crawford, Anthony J & Ezzell, John R & Miles, James A, 1995. "Bank CEO Pay-Performance Relations and the Effects of Deregulation," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(2), pages 231-56, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Paul, Jonathan M, 1992. "On the Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 471-502. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Edward J. Kane & Haluk Unal, 1990. "Modeling Structural and Temporal Variation in the Market's Valuation of Banking Firms," NBER Working Papers 2693, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Berger, Philip G & Ofek, Eli & Yermack, David L, 1997. " Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1411-38, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Sherwin Rosen, 1990. "Contracts and the Market for Executives," NBER Working Papers 3542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Kim, Daesik & Santomero, Anthony M, 1988. " Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(5), pages 1219-33, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Watts, Ross L., 1992. "The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 263-292, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Murphy, Kevin J., 1985. "Corporate performance and managerial remuneration : An empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 11-42, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Haubrich, Joseph G, 1994. "Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 258-76, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Ciscel, David H & Carroll, Thomas M, 1980. "The Determinants of Executive Salaries: An Econometric Survey," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 62(1), pages 7-13, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. DeGennaro, Ramon P. & Thomson, James B., 1995. "Anticipating bailouts: The incentive-conflict model and the collapse of the Ohio deposit guarantee fund," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1401-1418, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Kane, Edward J & Unal, Haluk, 1990. " Modeling Structural and Temporal Variation in the Market's Valuation of Banking Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 113-36, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Benston, George J & Kaufman, George G, 1997. "FDICIA after Five Years," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 139-58, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Baker, G.P. & Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Compensation And Incentives: Practice Vs. Theory," Papers 88-05, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
    Other versions:
  15. Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-54, May-June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Garen, John E, 1994. "Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1175-99, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. John, Teresa A & John, Kose, 1993. " Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(3), pages 949-74, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 43(3), pages 30-51, February.
  19. Thomson, James B, 1987. "The Use of Market Information in Pricing Deposit Insurance," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(4), pages 528-37, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Ceo Incentives - It'S Not How Much You Pay, But How," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 3(3), pages 36-49. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Mehran, Hamid, 1995. "Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 163-184, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  23. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1990. "Optimal financial structure and bank capital requirements: an empirical investigation," Working Paper 9007, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
  24. Shrieves, Ronald E. & Dahl, Drew, 1992. "The relationship between risk and capital in commercial banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 439-457, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Sloan, Richard G., 1993. "Accounting earnings and top executive compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 55-100, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Rosen, S., 1990. "Contracts and Market for Executives," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 90-12, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
  27. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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