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The FDICIA and bank CEOs' pay-performance relationship: an empirical investigation

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  • Ying Yan
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    Abstract

    A look at how the FDICIA changes the relationship between pay and performance for bank CEOs. It finds that the legislation improves healthy banks’ growth opportunities, making their CEOs’ total compensation less sensitive to performance. For unhealthy banks, total compensation becomes more performance-sensitive.

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    File URL: http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1998/wp9805.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its series Working Paper with number 9805.

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    Date of creation: 1998
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    Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9805

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    Keywords: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 ; Executives - Salaries;

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