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Management Control and Innovative Activity Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Dirk Czarnitzki ()
Kornelius Kraft
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This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest in innovative activities. There are opposing effects concerning R & D intensity in the manager-controlled firm. Our study on the determinants of R & D intensity presentsempirical results concerning this question. A sample of German firms with 4,126 observations is used to estimate Tobit and semiparametric censored least absolute deviation (CLAD) models. It turns out that the owner-led firms invest less into R & D than the managerial firms. With respect to the manager-led firms, we have mixed results concerning the question whether expenditures on R & D depend on the control exerted.
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization .
Volume (Year): 24 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
Pages: 1-24
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Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:24:y:2004:i:1:p:1-24Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100336
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2006-1, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
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Czarnitzki, Dirk & Binz, Hanna L., 2008.
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08-047, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
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Andrea Caggese, 2006.
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