Ownership structure among 470 U.K. listed companies is described by concentration indices and by "control type," the latter defined using both a fixed percentage shareholding and the "degree of control." The authors also test for possible controlling coalitions among groups of shareholders. Control-type effects on performance are tested using reduced-form equations for valuation ratio, profit margin, return on capital, growth rates, and directors' pay. There is no clear evidence to support managerial theories. Ownership structure is analyzed with the results that greater size and capital cost (beta) imply greater shareholding dispersion. A probit model of control type gives weak results. Copyright 1991 by Royal Economic Society.
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Volume (Year): 101 (1991) Issue (Month): 409 (November) Pages: 1418-37 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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