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Unternehmensleitung und Innovationserfolg

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  • Czarnitzki, Dirk
  • Kraft, Kornelius

Abstract

In dieser Arbeit werden die verschiedenen Anreize für Manager im Vergleich zu Unternehmenseignern untersucht, Innovationen durchzuführen. Bei den Anreizen treten gegenläufige Effekte der Innovationsanstrengungen auf. Unsere Untersuchung über die Determinanten des Innovationserfolges liefert empierische Ergebnisse zu dieser Frage. Es wird ein Sample von 2.018 Beobachtungen verwendet und es zeigt sich, dass eigentümergeführte Unternehmen geringere Umsätze mit Marktneuheiten erzielen, als managementgeleitete. Unsere Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass die Leitung von Unternehmen wichtige Konsequenzen für Produktinnovation hat. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 01-70.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5426

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Keywords: Innovationen; Manager-vs.eignergeleitete Firmen; Anreize; Tobit Regression;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Jürgen Janger, 2008. "Supply-Side Triggers for Inflation in Austria," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 2, pages 34–69.

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