Executive Compensation and the Optimality of Managerial Entrenchment
AbstractFirms are more complicated than standard principal-agent theory allows: firms have assets-in-place; firms endure through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount of equity that can be awarded to any one manager; and, a firm's owner can transfer some control to a manager, thereby entrenching her. Recognizing these characteristics, we solve for the vesting dates; wage, equity and options components; and control rights of an optimal contract. Managerial entrenchment makes the promise of deferred compensation credible. Deferring compensation by delaying vesting reduces a manager's ability to free-ride on a replacement's effort.
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Date of creation: Sep 1996
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Other versions of this item:
- Gary Gorton & Bruce D. Grundy, . "Executive Compensation and the Optimality of Managerial Entrenchment," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 15-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
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