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A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Berglof, Erik
This article analyzes how an entrepreneur and an external investor allocate revenues and control among themselves in a venture capital relationship, given that they want to liquidate their holdings in the future. Within an incomplete contracting framework we generate contractual arrangements that closely resemble those observed in venture capital markets. In particular, we explain the predominance of preferred stock and convertible instruments. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.
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Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization .
Volume (Year): 10 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 247-67
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:2:p:247-67Contact details of provider: Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK Fax: 01865 267 985 Email: Web page: http://jleo.oupjournals.org/
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