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Poaching and firm-sponsored training: First clean evidence

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  • Mohrenweiser, Jens
  • Zwick, Thomas
  • Backes-Gellner, Uschi

Abstract

A series of seminal theoretical papers argues that poaching of employees may hamper company-sponsored general training. However, the extent of poaching, its determinants and consequences, remains an open empirical question. We provide a novel empirical identification strategy for poaching and investigate its causes and consequences. We find that only a small number of training firms in Germany are poaching victims. Firms are more likely to poach employees during an economic downturn. Training firms respond to poaching by lowering the share of new apprentice intakes in the following years. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 13-037.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13037

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Keywords: poaching; company sponsored training; recruiting; apprenticeship;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Fries, Jan & Göbel, Christian & Maier, Michael F., 2013. "Do employment subsidies reduce early apprenticeship dropout?," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research 13-053, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  2. Wagner, Robert & Zwick, Thomas, 2012. "How acid are lemons? Adverse selection and signalling for skilled labour market entrants," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research 12-014, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  3. Felix Wenzelmann, 2012. "Ausbildungsmotive und die Zeitaufteilung der Auszubildenden im Betrieb," Journal of Labour Market Research, Springer, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 125-145, July.

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