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To Match or Not to Match? Optimal Wage Policy With Endogenous Worker Search Intensity

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Author Info
Fabien Postel-Vinay (Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris)
Jean-Marc Robin (Universite Paris I)

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Abstract

We consider an equilibrium search model with on-the-job search where firms set wages. When an employee receives an outside job offer, it is optimal for the employer to try to retain the employee by matching the offer. This results in a wage increase for the worker. However, if workers are able to vary their search intensity, then this `offer-matching' policy runs into a moral hazard problem. Knowing that outside offers lead to wage increases, workers tend to search more intensively, which is costly for the firms. Assuming that firms can commit never to match outside offers, we examine the set of firm types for which it is preferable to do so. In particular, we show that a plausible pattern is one where a `dual' labor market emerges, with `bad' jobs at low-productivity, nonmatching firms and `good' jobs at high-productivity, matching firms. (Copyright: Elsevier)

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1094-2025(03)00058-9
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.

Volume (Year): 7 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 297-330
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Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:7:y:2004:i:2:p:297-330

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Related research
Keywords: Labor market frictions; Wage policy; Search intensity; Moral hazard;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Albrecht, James W & Axell, Bo, 1984. "An Equilibrium Model of Search Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(5), pages 824-40, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Beaudry, Paul & DiNardo, John, 1991. "The Effect of Implicit Contracts on the Movement of Wages over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Micro Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 665-88, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Pierre Cahuc & André Zylberberg, 2004. "Labor Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026203316x.
  5. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1998. "Motivation and Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 388-411, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Mortensen, Dale T. & Pissarides, Christopher A., 1999. "New developments in models of search in the labor market," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 39, pages 2567-2627 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Albrecht, James & Vroman, Susan, 2001. "Equilibrium Search with Time-Varying Unemployment Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2002. "The Distribution of Earnings in an Equilibrium Search Model with State-Dependent Offers and Counteroffers," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(4), pages 989-1016, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Margaret Stevens, 2004. "Wage-Tenure Contracts in a Frictional Labour Market: Firms' Strategies for Recruitment and Retention," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(2), pages 535-551, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Malcomson, James M., 1999. "Individual employment contracts," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 35, pages 2291-2372 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. B.J. Christensen & D.T. Mortensen & G. Neumann & A. Werwatz, . "On the Job Search and the Wage Distribution," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 2000-108, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
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  12. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1989. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 447-80, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1993. "Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 811-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Burdett, Kenneth & Mortensen, Dale T, 1998. "Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 257-73, May.
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Gernandt, Johannes & Pfeiffer, Friedhelm, 2005. "Einstiegslöhne bei unvollkommenen Arbeitsmärkten," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-26, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & Ricardo Lagos, 2004. " A Model of Job and Worker Flows," CDMA Conference Paper Series 0403, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Dale T. Mortensen, 2009. "Wage Dispersion in the Search and Matching Model with Intra-Firm Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 15033, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Carlos Carrillo-Tudela, 2009. "An Equilibrium Search Model with Optimal Wage-Experience Contracts," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 12(1), pages 108-128, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Grégory Jolivet & Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2003. "Wage distributions and wage dynamics in Europe and the US : lessons from a simple job search model," Research Unit Working Papers 0302, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Gautier, Pieter A & Moraga-González, José-Luis & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2007. "Structural Estimation of Search Intensity: Do Non-Employed Workers Search Enough?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6440, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Carlos Carrillo Tudela, 2004. "Wage-Tenure Contracts, Experience and Employment Status," Economics Discussion Papers 585, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Francis Kiraly, 2003. "On Employment Contracts with Heterogeneous Workers and Endogenous On-the-job Search," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2003/04, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University, revised Jan 2004. [Downloadable!]
  9. Postel Vinay Fabien & Robin Jean Marc, 2000. "Wage Dispersion with Heterogeneous Firm Technologies and Worker Abilities: An Equilibrium Job Search Model for Matched Employer-Employee Data," Research Unit Working Papers 0008, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA. [Downloadable!]
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