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Does Poaching Distort Training?

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  • Espen R. Moen
  • �sa Rosén
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    Abstract

    We analyse the efficiency of the labour market outcome in a competitive search equilibrium model with endogenous turnover and endogenous general human capital formation. We show that search frictions do not distort training decisions if firms and their employees are able to coordinate efficiently, for instance, by using long-term contracts. In the absence of efficient coordination devices there is too much turnover and too little investment in general training. Nonetheless, the number of training firms and the amount of training provided are constrained optimal, and training subsidies therefore reduce welfare. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell.

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/0034-6527.00317
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.

    Volume (Year): 71 (2004)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 1143-1162

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    Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:71:y:2004:i:4:p:1143-1162

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    Cited by:
    1. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2006. "Competing for Talents," Departmental Working Papers _177, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics.
    2. Mohrenweiser, Jens & Zwick, Thomas & Backes-Gellner, Uschi, 2013. "Poaching and firm-sponsored training: First clean evidence," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-037, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    3. repec:dgr:uvatin:2005070 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Chao Fu, 2010. "Online Appendix to "Training, search and wage dispersion"," Technical Appendices 10-77, Review of Economic Dynamics.
    5. Espen Moen, 2012. "Knowledge spillovers in competitive search equilibrium," 2012 Meeting Papers 913, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Espen Moen & Anna Godøy, 2013. "Mixed search," 2013 Meeting Papers 857, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Anurag Banerjee & Parantap Basu, . " Who pays for job training?," CDMA Conference Paper Series 0802, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis.
    8. Petra Marotzke, 2014. "Job Search and the Age-Inequality Profile," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2014-06, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    9. Espen R. Moen & Asa Rosen, 2007. "Incentives in competitive search equilibrium," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19663, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    10. Frederic Gavrel, 2014. "Participation, Recruitment Selection, and the Minimum Wage," TEPP Working Paper 2014-02, TEPP.
    11. Muehlemann, Samuel & Wolter, Stefan C., 2011. "Firm-sponsored training and poaching externalities in regional labor markets," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 560-570.
    12. Fei Li, 2013. "Efficient Learning and Job Turnover in the Labor Market," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-023, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    13. Gavrel, Frédéric & Lebon, Isabelle & Rebière, Thérèse, 2012. "Minimum wage, on-the-job search and employment: On the sectoral and aggregate equilibrium effect of the mandatory minimum wage," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 691-699.

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