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Poaching And Firm Sponsored Training: First Clean Evidence

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Author Info

  • Jens Mohrenweiser

    ()
    (Zentrum fuer Europaeische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim (ZEW) (Centre for European Economic Research))

  • Thomas Zwick

    ()
    (University of Wuerzburg)

  • Uschi Backes-Gellner

    ()
    (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich)

Abstract

A series of seminal theoretical papers argues that poaching of employees may hamper company-sponsored general training. However, the extent of poaching, its determinants and consequences, remains an open empirical question. We provide a novel empirical identification strategy for poaching and investigate its causes and consequences. We find that only a small number of training firms in Germany are poaching victims. Firms are more likely to suffer poaching during an economic downturn. Training firms respond to poaching by lowering the share of trainees in the following years.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU) in its series Economics of Education Working Paper Series with number 0051.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2010
Date of revision: May 2013
Handle: RePEc:iso:educat:0051

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Keywords: poaching; company-sponsored training; recruiting; apprenticeship;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Robert Wagner & Thomas Zwick, 2012. "How Acid are Lemons? Adverse Selection and Signalling for Skilled Labour Market Entrants," Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0071, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), revised Feb 2012.
  2. Felix Wenzelmann, 2012. "Ausbildungsmotive und die Zeitaufteilung der Auszubildenden im Betrieb," Journal of Labour Market Research, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 125-145, July.
  3. Fries, Jan & Göbel, Christian & Maier, Michael F., 2013. "Do employment subsidies reduce early apprenticeship dropout?," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-053, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.

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