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Shirking and Motivation in Firms: Survey Evidence on Worker Attitudes

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Author Info
Lanse Minkler (University of Connecticut)

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Abstract

In an extensive national survey, 82.7% of the respondents report that they are very likely to keep an agreement to work hard if they agreed to, even if it was almost impossible for their employer to monitor them. Based on mean responses, the rank order of motivations in descending importance is: moral, intrinsic, peer-pressure, and positive incentives. Respondents also report that fairness considerations are important and that they are especially likely to keep agreements to do a good job with honest employers. Logit analysis indicates that increases in moral and intrinsic motivations increase the likelihood of keeping agreements to provide effort. The evidence suggests that we need to re-examine a foundational assumption underlying the theory of the firm.

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Paper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2002-37.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2002
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Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2002-37

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Keywords: Theory of firm shirking incentives moral motivations intrinsic motivations fairness attitudes.

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dennis Dittrich & Martin G. Kocher, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-098/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Jana Vyrastekova & Sander Onderstal & Pierre Koning, 2006. "Team incentives in public organisations; an experimental study," CPB Discussion Papers 60, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  3. David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Post-Print halshs-00175010_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Dittrich, Dennis & Kocher, Martin, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee under Endogenous Supervision," CEPR Discussion Papers 5962, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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