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Cooperation or rivalry? Employee’s effort and appropriate knowledge distribution as key elements for maximizing the profit of the firm

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  • Martin, Pardupa

Abstract

This paper is studying the evolution in the perception of the knowledge distribution and intra-firm operation and the way these factors affect the effort of employees. (organisational structure, back-office and front-office processes, etc. ) . The question this paper want to explore is whether “the employees shall cooperate or compete with each other and in what extent and how to minimize the negative effects and leverage the positive outcomes of both extremes”. This paper argues, that for specific group of the firms and professions, a rivalry among workers is more advantageous than for other and that the distinction is in the distribution of the knowledge in the firm at the top/centre/bottom level. The discussion at the end of the paper shows the practical applications, that firms might apply a right mixture of monetary and non- monetary tools to maximize the employees effort through simplification the knowledge flow and a case study is made, where the inflow of the knowledge and skills together with rising the level of rivalry are examined on leading entertainment group active in 3 Central- European countries.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26428/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 26428.

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Date of creation: 10 Nov 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:26428

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Related research

Keywords: competition; effort; incentives; knowledge distribution ; rivalry;

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  14. Williamson, Oliver E, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 233-61, October.
  15. Christian Grund & Niels Westergaard-Nielsen, 2008. "The Dispersion of Employees' Wage Increases and Firm Performance," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 61(4), pages 485-501, July.
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  17. Pierre Garrouste, 2001. "Knowledge: a Challenge for the Austrian Theory of the Firm," ICER Working Papers 26-2001, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  18. Casey Ichniowski & Kathryn Shaw & Giovanna Prennushi, 1995. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity," NBER Working Papers 5333, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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