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How organizations behave: towards implications for economics and economic policy

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Author Info
Robert S. Gibbons
Abstract

This essay begins with introductions to the two sides of organizational economics: the economics of internal organization (which focuses on the internal structure and functioning of organizations) and the economic theory of the firm (which focuses on organizations' boundaries and on relationships across these boundaries). Taken literally, these issues are only loosely related to the conference theme of "How Humans Behave," but the author does see a high-level parallel: both behavioral economics and organizational economics are investigating new approaches to modeling economic actors (individuals and firms, respectively). After these introductions to the two sides of organizational economics, the author then tries to connect "How Humans Behave" and "How Organizations Behave." In particular, he offers quick observations (hoping to prompt longer discussions) about (a) applying behavioral models in organizational settings and (b) how organizational settings might warrant new behavioral models. Finally, in an attempt to connect to economic policy, the author considers (c) what do organizations do, and whether it matters that these activities are conducted within organizations (rather than outside).

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Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in its journal Conference Series ; [Proceedings].

Volume (Year): (2003)
Issue (Month): Jun ()
Pages:
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedbcp:y:2003:i:jun:n:48:x:3

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Keywords: Macroeconomics ; Economics ; Economic policy;

References listed on IDEAS
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    Other versions:
  5. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1999. "The Firm as a Subeconomy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 74-102, April.
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    Other versions:
  7. James J. Heckman, 1976. "The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models," NBER Chapters, in: Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 5, number 4, pages 120-137 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Babcock, Linda & Loewenstein, George, 1997. "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 109-26, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Gibbons, Robert, 1997. "An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 127-49, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Klein, Benjamin, 1988. "Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 199-213, Spring.
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