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Lying, Integrity, and Cooperation

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  • Lanse Minkler
  • Thomas Miceli

Abstract

While talk is cheap to some, it is expensive to others for whom moral considerations come into play. We employ a simple two-stage modified prisoner's dilemma game where integrity is endowed on a continuum to analyze when agents will lie in random economic interactions. If there is sufficient integrity in the population, all agents make a promise in the first stage to cooperate in the second. Some agents always lie, some always tell the truth, and some behave conditionally. Enhanced cooperation is a byproduct of integrity. In a second random interaction without the possibility of exit, some agents “switch” their behavior, that is, some who lied in the first period now tell the truth in the second (they've “reformed”), and some who told the truth in the first period now lie in the second (they've become “cynical”).

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Review of Social Economy.

Volume (Year): 62 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 27-50

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Handle: RePEc:taf:rsocec:v:62:y:2004:i:1:p:27-50

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Related research

Keywords: lying; integrity; cooperation; prisoner's dilemma; moral motivation;

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References

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  1. Hausman, Daniel M & McPherson, Michael S, 1993. "Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and Contemporary Moral Philosophy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(2), pages 671-731, June.
  2. Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall.
  3. Guttman, Joel M., 1996. "Rational actors, tit-for-tat types, and the evolution of cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 27-56, January.
  4. Etzioni, Amitai, 1986. "The Case for a Multiple-Utility Conception," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(02), pages 159-184, October.
  5. Elster, Jon, 1996. "Rationality and the Emotions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(438), pages 1386-97, September.
  6. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Jon Elster, 1998. "Emotions and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 47-74, March.
  8. John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June.
  9. Bohnet, Iris & Frey, Bruno S., 1999. "The sound of silence in prisoner's dilemma and dictator games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 43-57, January.
  10. Sethi, Rajiv, 1996. "Evolutionary stability and social norms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 113-140, January.
  11. Lanse Minkler, 1999. "The Problem with Utility: Toward a Non-Consequentialist/Utility Theory Synthesis," Review of Social Economy, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 57(1), pages 4-24.
  12. Dowell, Richard S & Goldfarb, Robert S & Griffith, William B, 1998. "Economic Man as a Moral Individual," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(4), pages 645-53, October.
  13. Schneider, Friedrich & Pommerehne, Werner W, 1981. "Free Riding and Collective Action: An Experiment in Public Microeconomics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 96(4), pages 689-704, November.
  14. Frank, Robert H, 1987. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 593-604, September.
  15. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Lanse Minkler & Metin Cosgel, 2004. "Religious Identity and Consumption," Working papers 2004-03, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  2. Minkler, Lanse, 2004. "Shirking and motivations in firms: survey evidence on worker attitudes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 863-884, June.
  3. Donna Rowen & Michael Dietrich, 2004. "Incorporating Ethics into Economics: Problems and Possibilities," Working Papers 2004006, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2004.
  4. Martin, Ludivine, 2007. "The impact of technological changes on incentives and motivations to work hard," IRISS Working Paper Series 2007-15, IRISS at CEPS/INSTEAD.

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