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Lying, Integrity, and Cooperation

Author

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  • Lanse P. Minkler

    (University of Connecticut)

  • Thomas J. Miceli

    (University of Connecticut)

Abstract

While talk is cheap to some, it is expensive to others for whom moral considerations come into play. We employ a simple two-stage modified prisoner's dilemma game where integrity is endowed on a continuum to analyze when agents will lie in random economic interactions. If there is sufficient integrity in the population, all agents make a promise in the first stage to cooperate in the second. Some agents always lie, some always tell the truth, and some behave conditionally. Enhanced cooperation is a byproduct of integrity.

Suggested Citation

  • Lanse P. Minkler & Thomas J. Miceli, 2002. "Lying, Integrity, and Cooperation," Working papers 2002-36, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2002-36
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Cosgel, Metin M. & Minkler, Lanse, 2004. "Rationality, integrity, and religious behavior," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 329-341, July.
    2. Minkler, Lanse, 2004. "Shirking and motivations in firms: survey evidence on worker attitudes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 863-884, June.
    3. Donna Rowen & Michael Dietrich, 2007. "Are people ethical? An experimental approach," Working Papers 2007014, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2007.
    4. Donna Rowen & Michael Dietrich, 2004. "Incorporating Ethics into Economics: Problems and Possibilities," Working Papers 2004006, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2004.
    5. MARTIN Ludivine, 2007. "The impact of technological changes on incentives and motivations to work hard," IRISS Working Paper Series 2007-15, IRISS at CEPS/INSTEAD.
    6. Kaushik Basu, 2016. "Beyond the Invisible Hand: Groundwork for a New Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9299.

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    JEL classification:

    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General

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