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Lying, Integrity, and Cooperation

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  • Lanse P. Minkler

    (University of Connecticut)

  • Thomas J. Miceli

    (University of Connecticut)

Abstract

While talk is cheap to some, it is expensive to others for whom moral considerations come into play. We employ a simple two-stage modified prisoner's dilemma game where integrity is endowed on a continuum to analyze when agents will lie in random economic interactions. If there is sufficient integrity in the population, all agents make a promise in the first stage to cooperate in the second. Some agents always lie, some always tell the truth, and some behave conditionally. Enhanced cooperation is a byproduct of integrity.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2002-39.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2002-39

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  13. Lanse Minkler, 1999. "The Problem with Utility: Toward a Non-Consequentialist/Utility Theory Synthesis," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 57(1), pages 4-24.
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Cited by:
  1. Metin Cosgel & Lanse Minkler, 2004. "Religious Identity and Consumption," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 62(3), pages 339-350.
  2. Cosgel, Metin M. & Minkler, Lanse, 2004. "Rationality, integrity, and religious behavior," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 329-341, July.
  3. Donna Rowen & Michael Dietrich, 2004. "Incorporating Ethics into Economics: Problems and Possibilities," Working Papers 2004006, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2004.
  4. Minkler, Lanse, 2004. "Shirking and motivations in firms: survey evidence on worker attitudes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 863-884, June.
  5. Martin, Ludivine, 2007. "The impact of technological changes on incentives and motivations to work hard," IRISS Working Paper Series 2007-15, IRISS at CEPS/INSTEAD.

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