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Contracting Under Reciprocal Altruism

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  • Shchetinin, Oleg

Abstract

I develop a model of contracting under reciprocal altruism accounting for some evidence which is paradoxical from the point of view of neoclassical models with selfish actors. My model predicts the crowding-out effect observed in the Trust Game with the possibility of a fine; for the Control Game the model predicts that an equilibrium can exhibit "no effect of control", "hidden cost of control", or "positive effect of control", depending on the characteristics of the actors, as observed in the lab. This suggests that reciprocal altruism modeling could be fruitful more generally in applications of contract theory.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 13457.

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Date of creation: 16 Feb 2009
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13457

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Keywords: Reciprocal Altruism; Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation; Behavioral Economics; Signaling; Contract Theory;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Bassi, Matteo & Pagnozzi, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2014. "Optimal contracting with altruism and reciprocity," Research in Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 27-38.
  2. Shchetinin, Oleg, 2012. "Motivated Agents with Career Concerns: Signalling skills and organizational involvement," Working Papers in Economics, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics 524, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  3. Danilov, Anastasia & Sliwka, Dirk, 2013. "Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 7477, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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