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Contracting Under Reciprocal Altruism

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Author Info
Shchetinin, Oleg

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Abstract

I develop a model of contracting under reciprocal altruism accounting for some evidence which is paradoxical from the point of view of neoclassical models with selfish actors. My model predicts the crowding-out effect observed in the Trust Game with the possibility of a fine; for the Control Game the model predicts that an equilibrium can exhibit "no effect of control", "hidden cost of control", or "positive effect of control", depending on the characteristics of the actors, as observed in the lab. This suggests that reciprocal altruism modeling could be fruitful more generally in applications of contract theory.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15430/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 13457.

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Date of creation: 16 Feb 2009
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13457

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Related research
Keywords: Reciprocal Altruism; Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation; Behavioral Economics; Signaling; Contract Theory.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  16. Gachter, Simon & Falk, Armin, 2002. " Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 104(1), pages 1-26. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Dirk Sliwka, 2007. "Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 999-1012, June. [Downloadable!]
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