References listed on IDEAS
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1. Falk, Armin & Gachter, Simon & Kovacs, Judit, 1999. "Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives in a repeated game with incomplete contracts," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 251-284, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Dickinson, David L, 1999. "An Experimental Examination of Labor Supply and Work Intensities," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(4), pages 638-70, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Camerer, Colin, et al, 1997. "Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(2), pages 407-41, May.
   Other versions:
   • Camerer, Colin & Babcock, Linda & Loewenstein, George & Thaler, Richard, 1996. "Labor Supply of New York City Cab Drivers: One Day At A time," Working Papers 960, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
4. Akerlof, George A, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-69, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Gary Charness, 2004. "Attribution and Reciprocity in an Experimental Labor Market," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 665-688, July. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Gary Charness, 2004. "Attribution And Reciprocity In An Experimental Labor Market," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 08-04, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
6. Adriana D. Kugler & Gilles Saint-Paul, 2004. "How Do Firing Costs Affect Worker Flows in a World with Adverse Selection?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 553-584, July. [Downloadable!]
7. Fehr, Ernst & Götte, Lorenz, 2004. "Do Workers Work More When Wages Are High? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 1002, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
8. Michel André Maréchal & Christian Thöni, 2007. "Do Managers Reciprocate? Field Experimental Evidence From a Competitive Market," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2007 2007-09, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
9. Oriana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2007. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence From a Firm-Level Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(2), pages 729-773, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Oriana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2006. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 2062, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   • Orana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2006. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment," Natural Field Experiments 0015, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
   • Bandiera, Oriana & Barankay, Iwan & Rasul, Imran, 2006. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 5649, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Riedl, Arno, 1995. "Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental Markets," Economics Series 14, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Ernst Fehr & Georg Kirchsteiger & Arno Riedl, 2003. "Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental Markets," Labor and Demography 0305002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    • Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Riedl, Arno, 1998. "Gift exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-34, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Armin Falk, 2007. "Gift Exchange in the Field," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(5), pages 1501-1511, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Simon, Herbert A, 1991. "Organizations and Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 25-44, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Heike Hennig-Schmidt & Bettina Rockenbach & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2005. "In Search of Workers' Real Effort Reciprocity - A Field and a Laboratory Experiment," Discussion Papers 55, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Heike Hennig-Schmidt & Bettina Rockenbach & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2005. "In Search of Worker’s Real Effort Reciprocity – A Field and a Laboratory Experiment," Artefactual Field Experiments 0056, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
    • Heike Hennig-Schmidt & Bettina Rockenbach & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2008. "In Search of Workers' Real Effort Reciprocity - A Field and a Laboratory Experiment," Discussion Papers 238, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
14. Ernst Fehr & Lorenz Götte, 2005. "Do Workers Work More if Wages are High? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment," IEW - Working Papers iewwp125, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Lorenz Götte & Ernst Fehr, 2002. "Do Workers Work More if Wages Are High? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment," Natural Field Experiments 0047, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
    • Ernst Fehr & Lorenz Goette, 2007. "Do Workers Work More if Wages Are High? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 298-317, March. [Downloadable!]
15. Fehr, Ernst & Gachter, Simon, 1998. "Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 845-859, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. H. Lorne Carmichael & W. Bentley MacLeod, 1997. "Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 338., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Carmichael, H Lorne & MacLeod, W Bentley, 1997. "Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(3), pages 485-509, August.
17. R. Lynn Hannan & John H. Kagel & Donald V. Moser, 2002. "Partial Gift Exchange in an Experimental Labor Market: Impact of Subject Population Differences, Productivity Differences, and Effort Requests on Behavior," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(4), pages 923-951, October. [Downloadable!]
18. James C. Cox & Cary A. Deck, 2005. "On the Nature of Reciprocal Motives," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(3), pages 623-635, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Gachter, Simon & Falk, Armin, 2002. " Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 104(1), pages 1-26. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Simon Gaechter & Armin Falk, . "Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation," IEW - Working Papers iewwp019, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Fehr, Ernst & Brown, Martin & Zehnder, Christian, 2008. "On Reputation: A Microfoundation of Contract Enforcement and Price Rigidity," IZA Discussion Papers 3655, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Ernst Fehr & Martin Brown & Christian Zehnder, 2008. "On reputation: A microfoundation of contract enforcement and price rigidity," IEW - Working Papers iewwp384, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
   • Fehr, Ernst & Brown, Martin & Zehnder, Christian, 2008. "On Reputation: A Microfoundation of Contract Enforcement and Price Rigidity," Working Papers 2008-17, Swiss National Bank. [Downloadable!]
   • Ernst Fehr & Martin Brown & Christian Zehnder, 2009. "On Reputation: A Microfoundation of Contract Enforcement and Price Rigidity," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(536), pages 333-353, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Uschi Backes-Gellner & Donata Bessey & Kerstin Pull & Simone Tuor, 2008. "What Behavioural Economics Teaches Personnel Economics," Working Papers 0077, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU). [Downloadable!]
3. Florian Englmaier & Stephen Leider, 2008. "Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
4. Michel André Maréchal & Christian Thöni, 2007. "Do Managers Reciprocate? Field Experimental Evidence From a Competitive Market," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2007 2007-09, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
5. Shchetinin, Oleg, 2009. "Contracting Under Reciprocal Altruism," MPRA Paper 13457, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
6. Sebastian Kube & Michel André Maréchal & Clemens Puppe, 2008. "The Currency of Reciprocity - Gift-Exchange in the Workplace," IEW - Working Papers iewwp377, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]