We study the role of reciprocity in a labor market field experiment. In a recent paper, Gneezy and List (2006) investigate the impact of gift exchange in this context and find that it has only a transient effect on long run outcomes. Extending their work to examine both positive and negative reciprocity, we find consonant evidence in the positive reciprocity condition: the gift does not work well in the long run (if at all). Yet, in the negative reciprocity treatment we observe much stronger effects: a wage reduction has a significant and lasting negative impact on efforts. Together, these results highlight the asymmetry of positive and negative reciprocity that exists in the field, and provide an indication of the relative importance of each in the long run.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, 2004.
"Field Experiments,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1009-1055, December.
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Paulo Trigo Pereira & Nuno Silva & João Andrade e Silva, 2002.
"Positive and negative reciprocity in labor market,"
Working Papers
2002/03, Department of Economics at the School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon..
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Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2005.
"Fairness and Contract Design,"
Discussion Papers
67, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus M Schmidt, 2007.
"Fairness and Contract Design,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 121-154, 01.
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