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In Search of Workers' Real Effort Reciprocity - A Field and a Laboratory Experiment

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Author Info
Heike Hennig-Schmidt (Laboratory of Experimental Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, 53113 Bonn, Germany, Tel. +49 228 7391-95 (Fax -93), http://www.bonneconlab.uni-bonn.de, hschmidt@uni-bonn.de)
Bettina Rockenbach (Lehrstuhl für Mikrooekonomie, Universitaet Erfurt, Postfach 900 221, 99105 Erfurt, Germany, Tel. +49 361 73745-21 (Fax: -29), http://www.uni-erfurt.de/mikrooekonomie, bettina.rockenbach@uni-erfurt.de)
Abdolkarim Sadrieh (Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Magdeburg, Postbox 4120, 39016 Magdeburg, Germany, Tel. +49 391 67-18492 (Fax. 11355), http://www.ww.unimagdeburg.de/ebusiness/, sadrieh@ww.uni-magdeburg.de)

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Abstract

We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work effort of employees with hourly wages. Work effort neither reacts to an increase of the own wage, nor to a positive or negative peer comparison. This result seems at odds with numerous laboratory experiments that show a clear own wage sensitivity on effort. In an additional real-effort laboratory experiment we show that explicit cost and surplus information that enables to exactly calculate employer’s surplus from the work contract is a crucial pre-requisite for a positive wage-effort relation. This demonstrates that employee’s reciprocity requires a clear assessment of the surplus at stake.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Papers with number 55.

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Date of creation: Jul 2005
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Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:55

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Related research
Keywords: efficiency wage; reciprocity; fairness; field experiment; real effort;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Uri Gneezy & John A List, 2006. "Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1365-1384, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Dickinson, David L, 1999. "An Experimental Examination of Labor Supply and Work Intensities," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(4), pages 638-70, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Camerer, Colin, et al, 1997. "Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(2), pages 407-41, May.
    Other versions:
  4. Akerlof, George A, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-69, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Gary Charness, 2004. "Attribution and Reciprocity in an Experimental Labor Market," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 665-688, July. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2004. "Do Co-Workers’ Wages Matter? Theory and Evidence on Wage Secrecy, Wage Compression and Effort," IZA Discussion Papers 1417, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  7. Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, 2004. "Field Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1009-1055, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Adriana D. Kugler & Gilles Saint-Paul, 2004. "How Do Firing Costs Affect Worker Flows in a World with Adverse Selection?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 553-584, July. [Downloadable!]
  9. Armin Falk & Andrea Ichino, 2004. "Clean Evidence on Peer Effects," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000439, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Akerlof, George A & Yellen, Janet L, 1990. "The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 255-83, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, 2003. "Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market," Labor and Demography 0305001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Gary Charness & Peter Kuhn, 2005. "Pay Inequality, Pay Secrecy, and Effort: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 11786, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Mitzkewitz, Michael & Nagel, Rosemarie, 1993. "Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 171-98.
  14. Fehr, Ernst, et al, 1998. "When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(2), pages 324-51, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Gachter, Simon & Falk, Armin, 2002. " Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 104(1), pages 1-26. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Charles Bellemare & Bruce Shearer, 2007. "Gift Exchange within a Firm: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Cahiers de recherche 0708, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Sadreih, A. & Hennig-Schmidt, H. & Rockenbach, B., 2003. "Incomplete and asymmetric surplus information in labor relations," Discussion Paper 121, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Andreas Nicklisch & Tobias Salz, 2008. "Reciprocity and status in a virtual field experiment," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_37, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  4. Dur, Robert, 2008. "Gift Exchange in the Workplace: Money or Attention?," IZA Discussion Papers 3839, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Mirco Tonin & Michael Vlassopoulos, 2009. "Disentangling the Sources of Pro-social Behavior in the Workplace: A Field Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Sebastian Kube & Michel André Maréchal & Clemens Puppe, 2008. "The Currency of Reciprocity - Gift-Exchange in the Workplace," IEW - Working Papers iewwp377, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  7. Robert Dur, 2008. "Gift Exchange in the Workplace," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-082/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  8. Stefania Bortolotti & Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2009. "Exploring the effects of real effort in a weak-link experiment," CEEL Working Papers 0901, Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]
  9. Robert Dur & Arjan Non & Hein Roelfsema, 2008. "Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-080/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Sebastian Kube & Michel André Maréchal & Clemens Puppe, 2006. "Putting Reciprocity to Work - Positive versus Negative Responses in the Field," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2006 2006-27, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
  11. Heike Hennig-Schmidt & Bettina Rockenbach & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2003. "Incomplete and Asymmetric Surplus Information in Labor Relations," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse24_2003, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  12. Michel André Maréchal & Christian Thöni, 2007. "Do Managers Reciprocate? Field Experimental Evidence From a Competitive Market," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2007 2007-09, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
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