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The Currency of Reciprocity: Gift Exchange in the Workplace

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  • Sebastian Kube
  • Michel Andre Marechal
  • Clemens Puppe

Abstract

What determines reciprocity in employment relations? We conducted a controlled field experiment to measure the extent to which monetary and nonmonetary gifts affect workers' performance. We find that nonmonetary gifts have a much stronger impact than monetary gifts of equivalent value. We also observe that when workers are offered the choice, they prefer receiving money, but reciprocate as if they received a nonmonetary gift. This result is consistent with the common saying, "it's the thought that counts." We underline this point by showing that monetary gifts can effectively trigger reciprocity if the employer invests more time and effort into the gift's presentation.

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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.4.1644
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 102 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (June)
Pages: 1644-62

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:4:p:1644-62

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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. The Currency of Reciprocity
    by Ariel Goldring in Free Market Mojo on 2010-05-09 20:16:30
  2. The Best Study So Far on Cash VS Non-Cash Reward
    by Paul Hebert in Incentive Intelligence on 2011-03-22 12:31:59
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