Motivated Agents with Career Concerns: Signalling skills and organizational involvement
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More about this item
Keywords
career concerns; motivated agents; reputation building; mission driven organizations;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Statistics
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