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Designing conservation tenders to support landholder participation: A framework and case study assessment

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  • Whitten, Stuart M.
  • Reeson, Andrew
  • Windle, Jill
  • Rolfe, John

Abstract

Conservation tenders are emerging as a critical mechanism for supporting payments for ecosystem services in Australia and have been applied at the national, state and regional level. These tenders are designer markets or policy mechanisms in which the proactive participation of landholders is required for success. In this paper we develop a five step framework to identify barriers to participation and to support the design of conservation tenders. We consider participation in six case study tenders covering a variety of land management objectives using our framework. These case studies also provide further pragmatic lessons in managing participation in tenders. Participation supporting factors include alignment of management priorities, opportunity for payment/compensation, effective engagement via information workshops and site visits, and clear and uncomplicated bidding and contracting experiences. Post-contract support may require further attention. Attention to these design elements is likely to support adequate participation and achieve the competitive allocation of funds from which conservation tenders derive their economic efficiency outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Whitten, Stuart M. & Reeson, Andrew & Windle, Jill & Rolfe, John, 2013. "Designing conservation tenders to support landholder participation: A framework and case study assessment," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 6(C), pages 82-92.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecoser:v:6:y:2013:i:c:p:82-92
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecoser.2012.11.001
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    4. Philippe Coent, 2023. "Payment for environmental services related to aquifers: a review of specific issues and existing programmes," Review of Agricultural, Food and Environmental Studies, Springer, vol. 104(3), pages 273-310, December.
    5. Rolfe, John & Whitten, Stuart & Windle, Jill, 2017. "The Australian experience in using tenders for conservation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 611-620.
    6. Heagney, E.C. & Falster, D.S. & Kovač, M., 2021. "Land clearing in south-eastern Australia: Drivers, policy effects and implications for the future," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    7. Leah H. Palm-Forster & Scott M. Swinton & Frank Lupi & Robert S. Shupp, 2016. "Too Burdensome to Bid: Transaction Costs and Pay-for-Performance Conservation," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 98(5), pages 1314-1333.
    8. Bond, Anthelia J. & O’Connor, Patrick J. & Cavagnaro, Timothy R., 2018. "Who participates in conservation incentive programs? Absentee and group landholders are in the mix," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 410-419.
    9. Scheufele, Gabriela & Bennett, Jeff, 2017. "Can payments for ecosystem services schemes mimic markets?," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 30-37.
    10. Whitten, Stuart M., 2017. "Designing and implementing conservation tender metrics: Twelve core considerations," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 561-571.
    11. Sattler, Claudia & Matzdorf, Bettina, 2013. "PES in a nutshell: From definitions and origins to PES in practice—Approaches, design process and innovative aspects," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 6(C), pages 2-11.
    12. Zhaoyang Liu & Jintao Xu & Xiaojun Yang & Qin Tu & Nick Hanley & Andreas Kontoleon, 2019. "Performance of Agglomeration Bonuses in Conservation Auctions: Lessons from a Framed Field Experiment," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(3), pages 843-869, July.
    13. Chenyang Xue & Chaofeng Shao & Junli Gao, 2020. "Ecological Compensation Strategy for SDG-Based Basin-Type National Parks: A Case Study of the Baoxing Giant Panda National Park," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(11), pages 1-16, May.
    14. Star, Megan & Rolfe, John & Barbi, Emily, 2019. "Do outcome or input risks limit adoption of environmental projects: Rehabilitating gullies in Great Barrier Reef catchments," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 73-82.
    15. Thilo W. Glebe, 2022. "The influence of contract length on the performance of sequential conservation auctions," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 104(2), pages 739-764, March.
    16. Simanti Banerjee & Timothy N. Cason & Frans P. de Vries & Nick Hanley, 2021. "Spatial Coordination and Joint Bidding in Conservation Auctions," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(5), pages 1013-1049.

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