Testing and Implementing the Use of Multiple Bidding Rounds in Conservation Auctions: A Case Study Application
Abstract"Conservation auctions are typically framed as closed, discriminatory, single round, first-price auctions, and are based on the assumption that landholders will offer bids determined by their "independent private values." Where landholders are unfamiliar with conservation tender processes and the supply of environmental services, they may find it very difficult to construct bids in this way. Bid values may be influenced by other factors, such as concerns about "winner's curse," a desire to capture economic rent, and premiums for risk and uncertainty factors. Sealed, single round auctions may exacerbate information gaps and uncertainty factors because of the limited information flows compared to traditional market exchanges and open, ascending auctions. In this paper, the cost efficiencies of a multiple bidding round auction for landholder management actions are explored with the use of field experiments and a conservation auction. The case study application is improved grazing management in a rangeland area of Australia, where landholders are unfamiliar with supplying environmental services or conservation auctions. Results suggest that multiple round auctions may be associated with efficiency gains, particularly in initial rounds." Copyright (c) 2009 Canadian Agricultural Economics Society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie in its journal Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie.
Volume (Year): 57 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (09)
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