Bidding Behavior and Decision Costs in Field Experiments
AbstractWhether rationality of economic behavior increases with expected payoffs and decreases with the cognitive cost it takes to formulate an optimal strategy remains an open question. We explore these issues with field data, using individual bids from sealed-bid auctions in which we sold nearly $10,000 worth of sports cards. Our results indicate that stakes do indeed matter, as high-priced ($70) cards produced more of the theoretically predicted strategic behavior than did lower-priced ($3) cards. We find additional evidence consistent with the importance of cognitive costs, as subjects more experienced with sports card auctions exhibited a greater tendency to behave strategically than did less experienced bidders. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 40 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Other versions of this item:
- John List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2002. "Bidding behavior and decision costs in field experiments," Framed Field Experiments 00181, The Field Experiments Website.
- John A. List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2000. "Bidding Behavior and Decision Costs in Field Experiments," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0006, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
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