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The transferability and performance of payment-by-results biodiversity conservation procurement auctions: empirical evidence from northernmost Germany

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  • Markus Groth

    (Institute of Economics, University of Lüneburg)

Abstract

Managed grasslands contribute in a number of ways to the biodiversity of European agricultural landscapes and provide a wide range of ecosystem services that are also of socio-economic value. Against the background of a rapid biodiversity loss in agricultural landscapes, increasing attention is being paid to farming practices that enhance ecosystem services. Therefore developing cost-effective conservation payment schemes is the main challenge facing present European agri-environmental policy. This paper deals with the transferability of a payment scheme that combines a payment-by-results approach with the use of discriminatory-price conservation procurement auctions in order to improve the cost-effectiveness of conservation schemes for grassland plant biodiversity. Hence the design, implementation and results of the adapted case-study payment scheme in the county Steinburg in the northernmost federal state of Germany (Schleswig-Holstein) will be focussed. Results concerning the ecological-effectiveness of the payment-by-results approach as well bid-prices and potential cost-effectiveness gains by the use of conservation procurement auctions point out that it was possible to transfer the payment scheme successfully to another region, whereby the adapted case-study even outperforms the original case-study.

Suggested Citation

  • Markus Groth, 2009. "The transferability and performance of payment-by-results biodiversity conservation procurement auctions: empirical evidence from northernmost Germany," Working Paper Series in Economics 119, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:lue:wpaper:119
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Schilizzi, Steven & Breustedt, Gunnar & Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe, 2011. "Does tendering conservation contracts with performance payments generate additional benefits?," Working Papers 100883, University of Western Australia, School of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    2. Latacz-Lohmann, U. & Schilizzi, S. & Breustedt, G., 2012. "Auctioning outcome-based conservation contracts," Proceedings “Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues e.V.”, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA), vol. 47, March.
    3. Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe & Schilizzi, Steven & Breustedt, Gunnar, 2011. "Auctioning Outcome-Based Conservation Contracts," 51st Annual Conference, Halle, Germany, September 28-30, 2011 114523, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA).
    4. Herzon, I. & Birge, T. & Allen, B. & Povellato, A. & Vanni, F. & Hart, K. & Radley, G. & Tucker, G. & Keenleyside, C. & Oppermann, R. & Underwood, E. & Poux, X. & Beaufoy, G. & Pražan, J., 2018. "Time to look for evidence: Results-based approach to biodiversity conservation on farmland in Europe," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 347-354.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    agri-environmental policy; discriminatory-price auction; ecological services; experimental economics; multi-unit auction; payment-by-results; plant biodiversity; rural development.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics
    • R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations

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