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The Role of Auctions in Allocating Public Resources

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Author Info
Chan, Chris
Laplagne, Patrick
Appels, David

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Abstract

'The Role of Auctions in Allocating Public Resources' by Chris Chan, Patrick Laplagne and David Appels, was released on 20 February 2003. The paper provides an economic framework with which to consider the effectiveness and limitations of auction markets in allocating public resources. It links auction outcomes to bidders’ behavioural characteristics and to the lack or imbalance of information available to governments and bidders. The analysis covers the key elements of an auction, including the auction form, the auction environment, the bidding behaviour and the implications for allocative efficiency and revenue. The views expressed in this paper are those of the staff involved and do not necessarily reflect those of the Productivity Commission.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Productivity Commission in its series Staff Research Papers with number 31916.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ags:prodsr:31916

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Keywords: Public Economics;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2000. "Efficient Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(2), pages 341-388, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Cramton, Peter C, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
    Other versions:
  3. Cripps, Martin & Ireland, Norman, 1994. "The Design of Auctions and Tenders with Quality Thresholds: The Symmetric Case," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(423), pages 316-26, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Catherine D. Wolfram, 1998. "Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 703-725, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Elmar Wolfstetter, 2001. "The Swiss UMTS Spectrum Auction Flop: Bad Luck or Bad Design," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Wilson, Robert, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 511-18, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Rousseau Sandra & Moons Ellen, . "Auctioning Conservation Contracts: An Application to the Flemish Afforestation Policy," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0606, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment. [Downloadable!]
  2. Brett Bryan & Jeffery Connor et al, 2005., 2005. "Catchment Care - Developing an Auction Process for Biodiversity and Water Quality Gains. Volume 1 - Report," Natural Resource Management Economics 05_004, Policy and Economic Research Unit, CSIRO Land and Water, Adelaide, Australia. [Downloadable!]
  3. Markus Groth, 2009. "The transferability and performance of payment-by-results biodiversity conservation procurement auctions: empirical evidence from northernmost Germany," Working Paper Series in Economics 119, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Sophie Thoyer & Atakelty Hailu, 2005. "Multi-Unit Auctions to Allocate Water Scarcity Simulating bidding behaviour with agent based models," Working Papers 05-01, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jan 2005. [Downloadable!]
  5. Atakelty Hailu & Sophie Thoyer, 2005. "Multi-Unit Auctions to Allocate Water Scarcity Simulating Bidding Behaviour with Agent Based Models," Others 0512012, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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