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Competitions with Forward Contracts: A Laboratory Analysis Motivated by Electricity Market Design

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Listed:
  • Jordi Brandts
  • Paul Pezanis-Christou
  • Arthur Schram

Abstract

We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly. We find that, as theory suggests, for both types of competition the introduction of a forward market significantly lowers prices. The combination of supply function competition with a forward market leads to high efficiency levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis-Christou & Arthur Schram, 2003. "Competitions with Forward Contracts: A Laboratory Analysis Motivated by Electricity Market Design," Working Papers 66, Barcelona School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:66
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    electricity markets; forward Markets; experiments; competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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