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Oligopoly equilibria in electricity contract markets

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Author Info
James Bushnell ()

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Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11149-007-9031-2
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.

Volume (Year): 32 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 225-245
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:32:y:2007:i:3:p:225-245

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298

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Related research
Keywords: Cournot competition; Competition policy; Contracts; Electricity markets; L13; L94;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Frank A. Wolak, 2000. "An Empirical Analysis Of The Impact Of Hedge Contracts On Bidding Behavior In A Competitive Electricity Market ," International Economic Journal, Korean International Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 1-39, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Severin Borenstein & James B. Bushnell & Frank A. Wolak, 2002. "Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1376-1405, December. [Downloadable!]
  3. Green, Richard, 1999. "The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(1), pages 107-24, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. James B. Bushnell & Erin T. Mansur & Celeste Saravia, 2008. "Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition: An Analysis of Restructured US Electricity Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 237-66, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Fabra, Natalia & Toro, Juan, 2005. "Price wars and collusion in the Spanish electricity market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 155-181, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Severin Borenstein, 2002. "The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding California's Restructuring Disaster," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 191-211, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Mahenc, P. & Salanie, F., 2004. "Softening competition through forward trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 282-293, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Theories of oligopoly behavior," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 329-414 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. David M. Newbery, 1998. "Competition, Contracts, and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 726-749, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Borenstein, Severin & Bushnell, James, 1999. "An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California's Electricity Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(3), pages 285-323, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-26, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Joshua S Gans, 2004. "Vertical Contracting When Competition for Orders Precedes Procurement," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 123, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  13. Colin Loxley & David Salant, 2004. "Default Service Auctions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 201-229, 09. [Downloadable!]
  14. Powell, Andrew, 1993. "Trading Forward in an Imperfect Market: The Case of Electricity in Britain," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(417), pages 444-53, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Liski, Matti & Montero, Juan-Pablo, 2006. "Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 212-230, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Mansur, Erin T, 2007. "Upstream Competition and Vertical Integration in Electricity Markets," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(1), pages 125-56, February.
  17. Hughes, John S. & Kao, Jennifer L., 1997. "Strategic forward contracting and observability," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 121-133, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Meredith Fowlie, 2008. "Incomplete Environmental Regulation, Imperfect Competition, and Emissions Leakage," NBER Working Papers 14421, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. James B. Bushnell & Erin T. Mansur & Celeste Saravia, 2007. "Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition An Analysis of Restructured U.S. Electricity Markets," NBER Working Papers 13507, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Veronika Grimm & Gregor Zoettl, 2006. "Access to Commitment Devices Reduces Investment Incentives in Oligopoly," Working Paper Series in Economics 25, University of Cologne, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. de Frutos, Maria-Angeles & Fabra, Natalia, 2008. "On the Impact of Forward Contract Obligations in Multi-Unit Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6756, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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